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Abstract
Nonprofit hospitals are under increased pressure to maintain financial stability and
compliance with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) net community benefit requirements.
Boards of directors are not always confident that the compensation packages awarded to
executives stimulate them to act in the organization’s best interest. The principal-agent
theory formed the basis of this correlational study. Archival data from National Center
for Charitable Statistics, Guidestar, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services
were collected from 117 nonprofit urban hospitals for the fiscal year 2013. Regression
analysis was used to determine the significance of relationships between return on assets
(ROA), change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits expense and average
executive compensation (AEC). ROA and profit demonstrated a significant relationship
with AEC. The direction of the relationship between profit and AEC was positive while
the relationship with ROA and AEC was negative. There was no significant relationship
between net community benefit and AEC. The implications for positive social change
include improved understand of executive compensation alignment, job creation, and IRS
net community benefits expense requirements. Lawmakers may use the information to
create legislation related to net community benefits expense requirements.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Organizational success depends on a firm leadership’s ability to create
sustainability (Ngo & Cass, 2013). In the United States, the nonprofit hospital (NPH)
industry must maintain a high level of organizational efficiency to be successful
(Himmelstein et al., 2014). In an era of increasing cost and regulation, NPH boards of
directors must be sure that executive actions align with the strategic goals of the
organization (Brandes, Dharwadkar, & Suh, 2015). The primary mechanism available to
boards of directors is the alignment of executive compensation with the goals of the
organization (Kolev, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2014). In addition to sustaining
financial performance, NPHs must also comply with Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
regulations necessary to maintain a not-for-profit status as defined by Section 501(c)(3)
of the IRS tax code (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015). NPH boards of directors
may benefit knowing how executives’ compensation relates to company performance as
measured by (a) return on assets (ROA), (b) changes in net assets (profit), and (c) net
community benefits expense as required by the IRS tax code (Young, Chou, Alexander,
Lee, & Raver, 2013).
Background of the Problem
NPH executive compensation in the United States has risen steadily, increasing
interest in the relationship between firm performance and executive pay (Balsam &
Harris, 2014). Although researchers such as Murphy (2013) have identified a significant
association between the variables of performance and compensation, others such as Jenter
and Kanaan (2015) have conducted studies examining CEO compensation and firm
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performance, concluding that the relationship existed but was limited. Corporate
governance committees following directives from their boards of directors take on the
task of setting executive salaries and determining that average executive compensation
(AEC) aligns with the interests of shareholders (Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014).
These committees’ primary task is creating salaries and bonuses for the executives that
link to the goals of the organization and the interest of stakeholders (Sanchez-Marin &
Baixauli-Soler, 2014). Compensation packages for executives are heavily dependent
upon business performance and usually include incentives such as restricted stock, stock
options, and bonuses (Martin, Gomez-Meija, & Wiseman, 2012).
In addition, a complete incentive package would include a salary directly linked
to changes in the company’s stock price (Amoruso & Beams, 2014). Although NPHs do
not issue stock, NPH boards are under pressure to ensure financial performance and may
benefit from the alignment of executive compensation with business objectives (Saxton,
Oh, & Kishore, 2013). Newton (2015) noted NPH governance committees can make
excellent business decisions knowing a relationship exists between executive
compensation and hospitals’ performance.
Problem Statement
Branson, Buxton, Chen, and Smith (2014) noted the difficult decisions NPH
boards of directors must make as a result of regulatory oversight and intense competition;
executive compensation packages that align with hospital strategic objectives is a
necessity for survival. Although the awarded compensation packages for NPH executives
increased 244% in the last ten years (Cao & Wang, 2013), NPH executive compensation
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packages are still 25% less than for their for-profit counterparts (Peterburgsky, 2012).
The general business problem is that boards of directors are not always confident that the
compensation packages awarded to executives stimulate their behavior to act in the
organization’s best interest. The specific business problem is that some U.S. NPH boards
of directors do not know the relationship between financial performance as measured by
ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and executive
compensation.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. The population
for this study was U.S. NPHs that met the following criteria: (a) provide short-term acute
care, (b) classified as urban by Medicare, and (c) have more than 250 patient beds. The
independent variables for this study included (a) financial performance as measured by
ROA, (b) net profit as measured by the change in net assets, and (c) the total dollar
amount of net community benefits expense. The dependent variable was AEC, including
bonuses. I normalized the change in net assets; community benefits expense, and
compensation by including average daily census (ADC) as a controlling independent
variable. Stanowski and Lynn (2015) indicated that ADC accurately portrays hospital
size. Contributions from this study may encourage a change in business practice through
NPH governance committees pinpointing proper incentive packages for executives.
Social change from this study may include decision-making persons using results from
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this study to establish appropriate executive compensation packages that align with
company performance to provide a stable level of health care services to the public while
improving the urban economy.
Nature of the Study
Three research methods were available for this study: (a) quantitative, (b)
qualitative, and (c) mixed methods (Raich, Müller, & Abfalter, 2014). The quantitative
methods were most suitable for this study because I examined quantitative information
and relationships existing between dependent and independent variables. Soederberg
Miller (2014) indicated that quantitative data if used correctly, reflects accuracy and
comprehension of a given set of data. Researchers can examine a phenomenon via
collecting and analyzing numerical data for both independent and dependent variables of
a study (Yilmaz, 2013). Qualitative research involves a subjective exploration of data and
prohibits objective measurements within the sample population (Gioia, Corley, &
Hamilton, 2012). Mixed methods include both quantitative and qualitative design
methodologies (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). The purpose of this study was to examine
the relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets, (c) net community benefits
expense, and (d) executive compensation, which did not involve an exploration of
qualitative data. Neither qualitative nor mixed methods were appropriate for this study.
The three commonly used quantitative research designs include (a) correlational,
(b) descriptive, and (c) experimental (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). According to
Boslaugh (2013), the correlational design allows a researcher to test the hypothesis that
two or more variables relate to one another. Correlational design was the best method for
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this study because the design permits the examination of relationships existing between
quantitative variables. Yarcheski, Mahon, and Yarcheski (2012) stated that a descriptive
research design results in a description of the status of identified variables. The
description of the variables was not the primary focus of this study. Tang and Zhang
(2013) noted that an experimental design involves manipulation of independent variables.
The experimental design provided no benefits to this study because data manipulation
was outside of the scope of this study.
Research Question
The overarching research question was the following: What is the relationship
between urban U.S. NPH financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net
assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation?
Hypotheses
Based on the previously noted research question, I tested the following
hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant predictive relationship
between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community benefits expense,
and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant predictive
relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community
benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry.
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this study was the principal-agent problem, also
known as the agency theory (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jergers, 2012). Agency
theory is a supposition that details business relationships existing between the principals
(owners) and agents (managers) of business (Jaskyte, 2012). Kistruck, Sutter, Lount, and
Smith (2013) described the assumption that without proper incentives, agents act in their
best interest. Bosse and Phillips (2014) used agency theory to help explain how principals
design incentives which align efforts of management with organizational goals (Bosse &
Phillips, 2014). For agents to perform in the best interest of the principals, compensation
and incentives should align with firms’ performance goals and shareholders’ interest
(Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Thus, agency theory provides an
appropriate framework for this study.
According to agency theory, the proper alignment of executive self-interest with
the organization’s interest occurs with the alignment of incentives in the executive salary
package (Saltaji, 2013). Song, Wang, and Cavusgil (2015) used agency theory to explain
the relationships between principals and agents. Song et al. argued that officers whose
compensation aligns with the principal’s interest would make decisions that maximize
organizational wealth. Takacs Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) noted the maximization
of wealth for the principal also maximizes the agent’s personal wealth while interests are
in alignment.
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Definition of Terms
Average daily census (ADC): A calculation of the mean number of patients on any
given day during a given year. The calculation divides the total patient days during the
year by the number of days the facility operated during the same period (Stanowski &
Lynn, 2015).
CEO compensation: Base salary, bonuses, and other benefits awarded to a
company’s CEO (Haynes, 2014).
Firms size: Total assets used to make earnings predictions based on organization
size (Al-Dhamari & Ismail, 2014).
Return on assets (ROA): An indicator of how profitable a company is considering
its total assets. To calculate the ROA, divide net income by average total assets (Pleshko,
Heiens, & Peev, 2014).
Statement of financial position: The nonprofit income statement is showing the
change in net assets as net income (Mwango, Makau, & Kosimbei, 2014).
Surplus revenue: Additional revenue generated by nonprofits that exceed their
expenses. Nonprofit organizations report surplus revenue on their statements of activity
(Chikoto & Neely, 2013).
Changes in net assets: Surplus revenue related to what for-profit organizations
call profit, net income, or revenue minus expenses (Chikoto & Neely, 2013).
Total patient days: The number of patients in a facility at the official midnight
census count performed on a daily basis (Stanowski & Lynn, 2015).
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
The assumptions of a researcher are those assumed factors that may potentially
influence the study (Kirkwood & Price, 2013). Researchers may have no hard data, may
never know if assumptions are factual, and may not control for assumed data. Examples
of assumptions include such items as honesty and the accuracy of information used. If
data are anecdotal, it may be best not to report them as they are not necessarily valid or
reliable and are results of personal accounts rather than factual research. Consequently,
all assumptions were verified.
In this study, I assumed that the data published in the IRS Form 990 reports
within the NPH industry accurately expressed the firm’s financial position and executive
compensation. Bhargava and Manoli (2015) argued that violations of assumptions could
be detrimental to a study. If the assumptions of this study were invalid, the results of
statistical calculations might present inaccurate relationships between variables. The
outcome of this study includes recommendations for further research; violated
assumptions may affect subsequent researchers examining nonprofit executive
compensation.
Fan (2012) noted that educational research relies on credibility and reliability,
which increase with the use of documents certified by a branch of the U.S. government. I
assumed that information collected from the IRS Form 990 reports was complete and
accurate. The IRS Form 990 provided the most accurate data on compensation, company
performance, and net community benefits expense for the year selected for this study.
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Limitations
Limitations are factors beyond the researcher’s control (Brutus, Aguinis, &
Wassmer, 2013). Limitations are the shortcomings, influences, or conditions researchers
cannot control; limitations place restrictions on methodologies and conclusions. In
considering limitations of this study, I examined the analysis, nature of self-reporting,
instrument implementation, time restraints, and population.
To test the hypotheses, I analyzed data from all IRS Form 990s that met my
nonprobabilistic sampling criteria. The results of this study may or may not apply to other
industries or NPHs outside of my sampling criteria. Venkatesh, Brown and Bala (2013)
noted that practical limitations include stakeholders and their interpretations of empirical
research. Those stakeholders who have influence in NPHs may arrive at different
conclusions depending upon how they interpret the results.
Also, the results may vary if future researchers perform a similar examination of
for-profit, government, and privately held hospitals in the United States. Bai (2012) noted
the composition of boards of directors varies for profit-driven organizations and
influences their performance. The existence of a relationship between examined NPH
variables does not prove causality (Arrawatia, Misra, & Dawar, 2015). The examining of
cause-effect reasoning is outside the scope of this study.
Delimitations
The delimitations of a study are choices made by the researcher for various
reasons (Newcomer, Marion, & Earnhardt, 2014). I made choices in my study regarding
what I was not doing and why. I identified the literature not reviewed, the population not

10
studied, and the reasons why I did not use particular methodologies. I did not examine the
circumstances and situations in which compensation committees’ base executive pay.
Likewise, an inquiry into the motivation behind compensation decisions was beyond of
the scope of this study.
Ling Koh, Chai, and Tay (2014) noted the influence that time constraints place on
a researcher’s agenda. Such constraints during my doctoral study program did not allow
the opportunity to interview the boards of every NPH in the United States to find out their
motivation behind incentive packages. The data used for the study consisted of publicly
available information. This data reduced the reliance on executive members who may
have other, higher priority obligations.
The data for this included hospitals that (a) had accessible 2013 IRS Form 990s,
(b) provided short-term acute care, (c) were Medicare classified as urban, and (d) had
more than 250 patient beds. Large urban NPHs’ have unique problems based on their
location and size (Ko, Needleman, Derose, Laugesen, & Ponce, 2014). Ko et al. (2014)
noted that large urban hospitals are critical to the distribution of services to communities.
The research focused on large urban hospitals may not reflect issues of small or rural
hospitals. The final delimitation was the sampled year, 2013, which may prevent
generalization of results to other years. Wernz, Zhang, and Phusavat (2014) noted similar
reliability and generalization concerns within their study, which did not address the forprofit or government-sponsored hospital population. For-profit hospitals do not have
501(c)(3) nonprofit status and are not required to provide community benefits (Baltagi &
Yen, 2014). Baltagi and Yen (2014) confirmed that although government sponsored
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facilities are tax-exempt, their financial structure is very different compared to NPHs.
The generalization of results of this study may not apply to for-profit or governmentsponsored hospitals.
Significance of the Study
Contribution to Business Practice
Boards of directors of the U.S. NPH industry determine whether company
performance and executive compensation are in alignment (Wilkins, Hermanson, &
Cohen, 2015). This study is of value to business leaders because it may help boards of
directors make well-informed decisions related to executive compensation. These boards
may use the results of this study as a basis for appropriate executive compensation
packages. Executives must maintain a high level of financial performance to sustain the
organization’s mission (Zhang, Lawrence, & Anderson, 2014). The mission of NPHs, to
provide community benefits, negatively influences financial performance (Young et al.,
2013). The results of this study may contribute to the efficient practice of businesses by
assisting U.S. NPH boards in addressing conflicting goals as they develop executive
compensation plans.
Implications for Social Change
The implications for social change include boards of directors of organizations
comprehending how the performance of NPHs correlates with executive compensation.
Compensation incentives reward individuals for the work they perform and the increased
value they bring to the company (Hidi, 2015). The question was whether the executive
compensation package and business performance are in alignment to create a sustainable
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environment. Because the board of directors must agree on executive compensation,
those members charged with creating executive compensation packages should have
knowledge of the accounting returns for the enterprise. The board of trustees should
expect the return on assets to correlate with executive compensation (Sauerwald, Lin, &
Peng, 2014). Increasing understanding of executive compensation and business
performance could also benefit the board of directors by allowing them to use incentivebased executive rewards aligned with company performance.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
This literature review includes a comprehensive review of academic literature and
the theoretical framework supporting executive compensation. In this literature review, I
focus on compensation paid to executives in the NPH industry. The review also includes
an expanded view of executive compensation examples from other sectors. My research
question addressed ROA, changes in net assets, net community benefits expense, and
executive compensation. This study includes a review of the relationship between
business financial performance measures and executive compensation.
The strategy used for reviewing academic literature included the use of Walden
University Library databases, professional databases (Sage, ExecuComp, Capital IQ,
Social Science Research Network [SSRN]), and Google Scholar. These databases
provided access to scholarly and peer-reviewed articles and journals. The key words used
in the literature search include various combinations of the following: agency theory,
agency problem, stewardship theory, social contract theory, nonprofit hospital, executive
compensation, executive incentives, chief executive officer compensation, nonprofit, total
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compensation of chief executive officers. Additional keywords included nonprofit CEO
compensation, agency theory, history of CEO compensation, the board of directors,
compensation determination, firm performance, CEO incentives, return on assets, ROA,
surplus revenue, and net community benefit.
The parameters of the search were limited to peer-reviewed journals published
within 5 years of my graduation in May 2016. The 334 references that contributed to this
study consisted of 318 peer-reviewed articles, which represent 95% of all sources
exceeding the university required a minimum of 85%. Total references published
between 2012 and 2016 are 307, which represents 92% of all sources, exceeding the
university required minimum of 85%. The literature review includes 211 references, of
which 189 are published between 2012 and 2016.
A thorough examination of agency theory, which guided this study, is at the
beginning of the literature review. I examine the theory from its historical inception to its
business and practical applications in modern business environments. This section also
includes an examination of primary oppositional theories, providing explanations
regarding why those theories would not prove beneficial to this study. The pertinent
historical roots of scholar and practitioner analysis of compensation follow immediately
after.
In addition, an examination of nonprofit organizations and their history of
executive compensation is included. Succeeding the history of executive compensation is
a description of compensation structure, how payment calculation occurs for senior
managers, compensation measurements, and the power of the executives. The literature
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review also addresses firm performance, how to measure performance, executive
incentives based upon performance, and nonprofit executive compensation.
Agency Theory
The research question in this doctoral study addresses company financial
performance measured by ROA, changes in net assets, community benefits expense, and
their relationship to executive compensation packages. Van Puyvelde et al. (2012)
suggested that agency theory illuminates transparency and accountability within
nonprofit organizations. Likewise, Reid and Turbide (2012) noted that nonprofit
governance enables sustainability within organizations as they navigate through dynamic
changes. The primary objective of the study was governance, through which agency
theory provided the most suitable lens.
Agency theory history. Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) initiated an early
dialogue related to organizational theory. In the manuscript, Smith predicted that in a
firm controlled by an individual or group of persons other than the company’s owner(s),
the goals of the owner fall by the wayside. Numerous organizational theoretical inquiries
would follow over the next century and a half. For instance, Berle and Means (1932)
focused their discussion on the separation of ownership and control within big
businesses. Berle and Means noted that industries tend to consolidate with ownership
positions held by various individuals, limiting tan individual’s use of power.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) established a concern for ownership control
separation by illustrating economic influence through the theory of the firm. Their study
identified costs associated with the agency problem, including who handles the cost and
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why they are responsible. Means (1929) concluded that the corporate revolution had
occurred because only 11% of the largest 200 nonfinancial companies had an owner who
held the majority of its shares. Means identified two trends, the growth of concentrated
power and increasing stock ownership dispersal, which resulted in grander executive
control and shared ownership.
Dorsey (2014) operated under the assumption that the principal and agent are only
concerned with the maximization of their personal wealth. Dorsey argued that, according
to agency theory, the agent may at times not act in the best interest of the principal.
Pepper and Gore (2012) noted that contracts the principal negotiates with the agent are
heavily reliant upon firm performance. Bosse and Phillips (2014) observed that to protect
the principal’s best interest, executive incentives should align with company
performance.
The principal can also benefit from establishing monitoring mechanisms as a
means of controlling unacceptable behavior by the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
defined monitoring as a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, such as rules and
expenditure restrictions. The principal may also incur other monitoring costs such as
bonding and residual losses (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). Williams (1988) clarified such
residual costs as those in which agent decisions are different from that of the principal’s
interest.
Williams (1988) further argued that principals should seek to reduce extra costs.
To accomplish this reduction, the principal bears the cost of monitoring while the agent
assumes the bonding costs. In essence, the intricate agency expenses are the least of the

16
three. Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) examination excluded the normative aspect of
optimal contracts, focusing only on those that exhibited positive incentives under which
the design of contracts occur.
Typically, control and ownership separation occur once the principal reduces an
ownership stake by offering a fraction of the interest to new owners (Campbell,
Campbell, Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012). A chance to gain better utility may be the
deciding factor for principals selling a small interest in their corporation (Galle &
Walker, 2014). The interest sold is so small that new owners have no controlling interest.
An important notation to such a transaction is that the former owner will continue to
control the company as an agent while attempting to protect the interest of the new
owners who are principals.
While the new owners may expect a divergence of interest with the old proprietor,
new owners may still feel a need to monitor the actions of the former owner (Voronov,
De Clercq, & Hinings, 2013). The most efficient way to achieve this monitoring is to
subtract control costs from the agreed-upon purchase price (Hannafey & Vitulano, 2013).
Noe and Forgione (2014) mentioned new owners often use a strategy referred to as
pricing out, where a reduction in old owner’s wealth occurs from the net payment for
shares purchased. Voronov et al. noted that former owners could buy bonds that
guarantee interest alignment with new owners. Keeping agency costs to minimum levels
affects the wealth of the former proprietor and becomes an incentive to maintain low
levels of company expenses (Noe & Forgione, 2014).
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that original owners may dissolve their
ownership after examining factors such as bonding and monitoring costs as their
relationship to partially owned and owned assets. Jensen and Meckling noted this
scenario applies when the owner sells all controlling interest and continues to operate the
company in a managerial capacity. Such a newly positioned manager typically agrees to
compensate owners for defaults occurring because of their contracts (Goshen & Squire,
2015).
Business applications. Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the principal/agent
relationship because there was limited inquiry into large companies. The lack of
investigation necessitated addressing corporate control as resulting from the agency
problem. Fama (1980) noted that, while agency theory is a concern, larger firms use
established internal controls as a means of responding to outside competition. Fama
argued that domestic and external forces controlled by the market inevitably control the
managers of a company.
Fama and Jensen (1983a) examined the principal/agent concept in detail while
arguing that large firms use hierarchical decision-assignment models. The examples
illustrate decision control and decision management and their relationships with decision
management oversight and firm function accomplishment, respectively. Fama and Jensen
(1983b) noted four components that compose the decision control paradigm: initiation,
approval, execution, and evaluation. The solution to managing pending agency problems
with upper management is the appointment of boards of directors (Krause & Bruton,
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2014). This model allows the board to hold decision control authority while top
management maintains decision management privileges.
An established compensation model and business constitutions influence board
decisions regarding the agency problem (Saltaji, 2013). A board of directors composed of
outsiders seeks to ensure objectivity regarding the decisions of internal administrators.
The board of trustees appoints members to monitor major decisions and intervene when
necessary. Members of the governing council typically receive stock options or grants as
a means of incentivizing their decision alignment with principals (Galle & Walker, 2014).
This strategy helps diminish the principal-agent problem. However, market discipline
safeguards corporate governance fairness. In similar fashion, management control
systems allow managers to monitor employees (Inamdar, 2012). The only exception is
when the owner serves in a dual capacity and makes decisions, eliminating the conflict of
interest that would otherwise exist. Therefore, the need for separating accounting and
operational duties exists.
Practical application. Numerous researchers have supported the assumptions of
the agency theory. However, the assumptions in which the methods apply have varying
contexts. Examples of these various contexts are a company’s equity offerings as
illustrated by Shu and Chiang (2014). Additional examples include setting up a new
franchise, retail product development strategy development (Williams, Kannan, &
Azarm, 2011), and transactions involving labor unions. Although only a few of the
numerous contexts, agency theory application to business practice are the results of wellplanned strategies.
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Shu and Chiang (2014) noted the causes of why company size dictates adoption
strategies that likely increase firm value. Shu and Chiang found different approaches by
small and big businesses who place their shares on the market. Examining vast and small
firms, Shu and Chiang identified timing as an important element when offering equity.
Shu and Chiang noted that while larger companies rely upon discretionary accruals,
smaller entities rely on timing. Shu and Chiang argued that separate equilibriums be
appropriate for different approaches.
Shang et al. (2014) noted that, according to agency theory, problem mitigation
occurs through setting up franchises and eliminating the avoidance of duties by the agent.
The compensation franchisees receive nothing more than the residuals derived from their
owned units (Meiseberg & Ehrmann, 2012). The franchise bears the costs associated with
negligent decisions. Summarily, there is a growing base of support for agency theory,
with modern scholars and practitioners examining the theory as applied to newer variants
and originations.
Nonprofit. Agency theory applies to all industries including for-profit and
nonprofit (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). As NPH competition grows in the nonprofit
marketplace, organizations are increasingly required to become more efficient (Wellens
& Jegers, 2014). The governance structure of nonprofits is a critical component to an
organization’s success. If the governance committee or board of directors fails to increase
the effectiveness while meeting the needs of its stakeholders, the company could
eventually be at risk for closure.
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Nonprofit organizations face numerous obstacles as their executives pursue
various means of decreasing expenses while increasing effectiveness (White, Lomax, &
Parry, 2014). While different areas exist in which expense cutting is an option, executive
compensation and auditing fees consume significant financial resources. Scholars have
argued that executive compensation in nonprofits is excessive (Dhole, Khumawala,
Mishra, & Ranasinghe, 2015). Theoretical modeling suggests that the contracts of
executives are incentive based to encourage behavior (Eldenburg, Gaertner, & Goodman,
2014), ensuring that executive incentives are in alignment with the goals of the company.
The incentive-based contracts encourage effort on behalf of managers because their
personal wealth relates to firm performance. A lack of effort on senior executives’ behalf
may significantly influence their level of compensation.
The board of directors of the organization assumes the role of the principal while
the executive members bear the role of the agents (Botje, Klazinga, & Wagner, 2013).
Boards of directors are familiar with the quality guidelines applicable to hospitals,
allowing quality standards and the governing body to set goals. The board’s ability to
monitor quality within the organization contributes to proactivity (McConnell, Chang,
Maddox, Wholey, & Lindrooth, 2014). While the quality orientation proves to be a
valuable asset via opportunities for improvement, there is no relationship existing
between hospital performances.
The principal-agent theory also exists within the organization (Frey, Homberg, &
Osterloh, 2013). The executives assume the role of the principals while the employees
become agents (Van Puyvelde et al., 2013). The change in roles allows the executives to

21
focus on their managerial tasks and generate revenue through business activities (Pepper
& Gore, 2012). The employee who serves as the agent in this relationship contributes to
the executives’ success by pursuing objectives that contribute to the success of the
organization. Pepper and Gore (2012) noted as a countermeasure; the principal may find
grounds to hire new, like-minded agents.
Turbide and Laurin (2014) noted the agency theory mostly inspires the business
model of for-profit entities. While the purpose of nonprofit organizations is to create
benefits for the community, many have adopted the business models of for-profit firms
(Pennel, McLeroy, Burdine, & Matarrita-Cascante, 2015). Executives of nonprofit
organizations must establish excess revenue that diverts back into the firms’
sustainability and effectiveness. If the nonprofit executives’ compensation is dependent
upon excess, revenues generated as Grasse, Davis, and Ihrke (2014) distinguished,
executives’ interest align to encouraging innovation while consuming minimal resources.
Executives have found creative and innovative ways in which their nonprofit
firms can reduce cash expenditures (Büchner, Schreyögg, & Schultz, 2014). Malatesta
and Smith (2014) noted a few ways in which executives obtain critical resources while
using little to none of their own. Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen (2015) noted
executives have opted to merge with competitors, form alliances, and co-opt to increase
surplus revenue. The growth in excess revenues benefits the organization and executives
alike (Sedatole, Swaney, Yetman, & Yetman, 2014). If the executives did not have any
incentive package tied to firm performance, they would be reluctant to work with other
agencies (Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2014).

22
Nonprofit executives are not in the same operational paradigm as for-profit
managers (Pinho, Rodrigues, & Dibb, 2014). Nonprofit executives use similar aggressive
approaches to business. To compare with for-profit firms, Vermeer, Edmonds, and
Asthana (2014) found that nonprofits use far more aggressive behaviors than their forprofit counterparts do. Such behaviors illustrate an increase in performance. Ben-Ner and
Ren (2013) argued that performance-based executive compensation packages increase
executive efforts to exceed expected performance. Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño (2013)
noted agency theory significantly influenced executives and the decisions they make on
behalf of the organization. Speckbacher (2013) noted executives assume the role of
agents, their stakeholders, or those who have an interest in the organization assume the
principal function.
Alternative Theories of Explanation
In direct contrast to the agency theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) presented
stewardship theory. The stewardship theory is a model of management in which
managers are considered good stewards and will act in the best interest of owners
(Witesman & Fernandez, 2012). Donaldson and Davis (1991) further noted shareholders’
interests’ maximization occurs when sharing the responsibility for major decisions among
the employees in leadership roles. Conveyed using the stewardship theory, which
executives will be a good steward of company assets and resources (Bennett, 2013).
The family-owned business entity is the ideal culture that exemplifies the
stewardship theory (Jell, Block, Henkel, Spiegel, & Zischka, 2014). Likewise, Colli
(2013) argued that use of stewardship theory provide significant benefits to family-owned
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operations via lower transaction costs that increase stability over time. While this theory
relies on social psychology, its’ focus on the behaviors of executive management
members is outside of the scope of this study.
Gray, Owen, and Adams (1996) noted the social contract theory sees society as a
series of social contracts. Such contracts refer to implied macro-social and micro-social
contracts that relate to the community and the expectations of its businesses (Lacey &
Lamont, 2014). Greller (2015) noted the mere implication that an executive may have a
socially binding contract does not guarantee that the executives will act in the best
interest of the business, owners, or the community in which they conduct business.
The theoretical framework aids researchers in explaining that the company and
its’ owner are obliged to perform in the community’s best interest via social contract
obligations (Lozano, Carpenter, & Huisingh, 2015). The examination of a company’s
position on corporate and social responsibility is outside of the boundaries of this study
and renders the use of the social contract theory useless. While this approach may
provide benefits to other scholars and practitioners, the social implications are outside of
the scope of the study.
Executive Compensation
Academics and practitioners have examined executive compensation since the
introduction of separation of ownership from control beginning with Berle and Means
(1932) and the separation of financier and manager (Tan, 2013). Takacs Haynes (2014)
noted two primary sections of theory examining CEO compensation: agency theory and
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solutions outside of agency theory. The external examinations include such items as
politics, social associations, and managerial control.
Horton, Millo, and Seraseim (2012) examined over 4,000 firms, concluding that
the CEOs compensation relies upon their political and social status. Pepper and Gore
(2012) conducted similar research yielding results suggesting behavioral agency theory
provides optimal insight into CEO compensation packages. In each of the studies
(Horton, Millo, & Seraseim, 2012; Pepper & Gore, 2012), the boards of directors are
instrumental during compensation package assembly. The social status and behavioral
characteristics of the CEOs are contributing factors concerning compensation packages
with principals’ interest in mind (Brown, Fisher, Sooy, & Sprinkle, 2014).
To protect principals, CEO awards include stock options or grants that have
restrictions in which the stock must maintain a certain price (Branson et al., 2014; Denis
& Xu, 2013). If the CEO can take actions that increase the stock price, their
compensation package awards them. A growing trend among firms that sell or merge is
CEOs receiving larger compensation packages regardless of their choice to stay onboard
or exit (Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012). Ishii and Xuan (2014) noted CEOs tend to receive
bonuses and richly compensated after acquiring highly connected firms. In direct
comparison, Reddy, Abidin, and Woon (2012) nonprofit CEOs have similar monetary
increases.
History of Executive Compensation
Executive compensation is a term that appeared in the literature dating back to the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries according to Hoffman (2015). Researchers
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have studied the factors and appropriate levels of reward for chief executive officers of
publicly traded companies, focusing primarily on firm size and their surplus revenue
(Cao & Wang, 2013). The interest in surplus revenue and executive decisions dates back
to the early 20th century (Hoffman, 2015). At the beginning of the 20th century, Taussig
and Barker (1925) provided evidence that limits existed in increases in compensation and
how company performance correlated with compensation.
Taussig and Barker (1925) noted the lack of decrease in chief executive
compensation, even when company profits dropped. For instance, Pandher and Currie
(2013) suggested that executives are self-serving and may not work in shareholders’ best
interest by the maximizing of profit for the company if salary is not a derivative of
business performance. For that reason, Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) noted
researchers have focused their efforts on ascertaining the relationship existing between
CEO compensation and company size or profits.
Traditionally, the CEO compensation structure has consisted of numerous sources
and incentives based upon equity for both profit and nonprofit organizations (Balsam &
Harris, 2014). Sheikh (2012) noted the use of financial incentives as a form of motivation
for managers to work in the best interest of stakeholders and shareholders. Li and Qian
(2011) noted outside compensation committees increase CEO compensation at the
expense of shareholders. The lack of relationship associated with equity ownership led to
the owners of corporations monitoring CEOs (Desai, 2015). The performance of CEOs
provides a clear indication that incentives provided to CEOs positively influenced
decisions that increased company value (Martin, Wiseman, & Gomes-Mejia, 2015).
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While an equity compensation package tries to influence CEO decisions, guaranteed
alignment with profit maximization does not occur, and executive boards may require
additional CEO monitoring (Hou, Priem, & Goranova, 2014).
The categorization of CEO decisions falls into two theories: neoclassic and
managerialism, which explain compensation structure (van Essen, Otten, & Carberry,
2012). Managerialism asserts that a relationship exists between company size and chief
executive officer compensation. Frydman and Jenter (2010) concluded that, given
increasing executive pay for small-large cap companies, the large-cap companies have
had superior executive compensation increases. Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) noted
company size and its surplus revenue explain a portion of the CEO incentives gap
between small and large firms.
Scholars and professionals alike have attempted to measure the effects of CEO
compensation on business performance (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). Researchers have
concentrated on quantifying enterprise performance to the pay awarded to CEOs (Sun,
Wei, & Huang, 2013). Other researchers primarily focused on CEO incentives and
shareholder returns. Frydman and Jenter (2010) noted a general underestimation of CEO
compensation because of base pay as the primary focus and incentives and their
undervaluation. They concluded that the inclusion of all sources of CEO compensation in
a comparison to company performance provided best results.
When the board of directors awards stock options to CEOs, which creates a link
between company performance and CEO compensation (Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick,
& Coleman, 2012). The incentive packages have grown as a business profits increase
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(Fernando & Xu, 2012), which contributes to CEO compensation packages creating
higher paying contracts for increased risk to executives. The growing danger, related to
equity rewards, create wealth changes, which are results of company performance and its
equity (Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, & Sannikov, 2012).
The compensation packages awarded to CEOs have nearly doubled between 1994
and 2000, even as boards of directors have used options grants as an alternative
(Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, & Murphy, 2013). Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) noted
that although the stock price is sensitive to performance and increases CEO equity, CEOs
are holding fewer shares of stock and more options since 2005. Harford, Mansi, and
Maxwell (2012), via regression modeling, determined that options be decreasing as a
means of compensation and replaced with stock grants since 2001. While the boards of
directors are reducing salaries and increasing the use of stock (options and awards),
subsidies are increasingly becoming the method of incentive awarded to CEOs.
The structure of executive compensation. Each package awarded to CEOs is
proportionate to company size and typically have performance-based incentives
(Eldenberg, Gaertner, & Goodman, 2015). Incentives for CEOs manifest through
compensation packages that increase business value, possibly creating wealth for the
CEO paid in stock (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). These forms of compensation packages
provide CEOs with a base salary, bonuses, stock grants, or options, which fluctuate
depending upon the stock performance of the company, illustrating the strong
performance of the organization (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). Many packages contain stock
options whereby redemption must occur after a specified amount of time that the CEO
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has been in the corporation (Krug, 2013). The CEO’s stock options value changes
regarding the long-term performance of the enterprise (Edmans & Manso, 2011).
The retention of executives and continuity of leadership are factors that boards of
directors consider while establishing appropriate compensation packages (Hermanson,
Thompkins, Veliyath, & Ye, 2012). The compensation packages is a tool of the board of
directors to attract, employ, and retain top executive-level talent for their organization
(Frydman & Jenter, 2010). CEO compensation often parallels company growth along
with the complexity of the organization (Gritsko, Kozlova, Neilson, & Wichmann, 2013).
The boards of directors’ tasks include creating packages that align firm performance and
potential actions of the CEO, as well as package competitiveness for a limited pool of
talent.
Executive compensation determination. The board of directors develops
compensation packages for the CEO (Kabir & Minhat, 2014). However, the IRS and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have established rules applicable to boards
of directors (Vermeer, Edmonds, & Asthana, 2014). These rules dictate that companies
must rely on their directors and committees outside of their organization. The listing
requirements of the main stock exchanges call for said committees to operate
independently from the publically traded company. The typical reaction to this condition
is the formation of compensation committees that have independent directors (Bouwman,
2011).
These executive boards, composed of different members, establish executive
compensation. Dating back to the 1970s, outside directors serving on compensation
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committees, has increased alongside institutional ownership and CEO turnover (Kaplan
& Minton, 2012). The majority of compensations committees consist of outside directors
and institutional shareholders who handle the monitoring of company performance and
CEO compensation. Hermalin and Weishbach (2012) concluded that CEO pay raises are
the direct result of close CEO monitoring by major shareholders of corporate stock.
Reducing the principal/agent problem, compensation committees created by the
Board of Directors are primarily tasked to align CEO pay with shareholder interest. In
situations where the CEO pursues an agenda of his or her own and not those that
maximize shareholder wealth, an agency problem exists (Galle & Walker, 2014). Dalton
et al. (2007) concluded the mitigation of agency problems should include the board of
directors performing independent monitoring. The board should retain active corporate
control mechanisms that rogue discipline managers discovered via merger and
acquisitions.
The existence of complications with CEO’s pay results in compensation
committees using benchmarking tools (Prybil, Bardach, & Fardo, 2013). The
benchmarking tools assist in determining adequate compensation (Bizjak, Lemmon, &
Nguyen, 2011; Diprete et al., 2010). Faulkender and Yang (2010) explained
benchmarking as a method of comparison among industry competitors. A vast majority
of compensation committees (about 96%) use benchmarking as a tool when a
determining CEO compensation (Faulkender & Yang, 2010). Faulkender and Yang
(2010) further stated that a factor in CEO pay is rising is compensation consultants, hired
by compensation committees, using benchmarking. Although benchmarking simplifies
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the CEO compensation calculation process, the result may lead to larger packages for the
CEOs.
DiPrete et al. (2010) stated there must be an alignment of company performance
and CEO compensation. The corporate consultants hired to calculate and implement CEO
compensation recommend synchronizing CEO pay with that of the company’s stock
increases (Brandes et al., 2015). The link between company performance and CEO
incentive packages solely depends on one’s ability to generate appreciating stock. Stock
options allow compensation committees to incentivize CEOs by aligning their financial
rewards and wealth creation with improved company performance.
Nevertheless, the board of director’s task is to remain independent while creating
equity incentives aligning with shareholder interest (Laux & Mittendorf, 2012). Laux and
Mittendorf further determined that compensation committees of non-executive members
contribute to lower incentive packages possessing higher equity. The relationship
between stock options and company performance aligns with CEO agenda; compensation
committees are more likely to be composed of few or no executive members, resulting in
increased equity compensation.
A CEO’s past performance may also influence compensation package (Banker,
Darrough, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013). The assumption is that previous
performance indicates current ability. Researchers anticipate that base salary, a fixed
component, has a positive relationship with the company’s return on equity (ROE)
(Banker et al., 2013). Banker et al. established that a negative correlation exists between
bonus and company performance. Committees formed to establish CEO compensation
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would benefit from an evaluation of compensation to verify alignment with business
performance (Galle & Walker, 2014).
Wang (2011) indicated that the risk-taking actions of an influence enterprise
performance result within the context of the size of its board of directors. Through larger
incentive packages, executives have shown to take more risk (Wang, 2011). Wang argued
that CEOs with smaller oversight boards use less debt while taking on high-risk projects,
in direct contrast to their counterparts with a large board of directors. Considering project
risk, researchers have hypothesized that the negative influence on risk is a result of board
size (Schultz, Zippel-Schultz, & Salomo, 2012).
Additional examination of board size and CEO compensation indicated that the
larger the board size, the higher the CEO compensation (Garner & Harrison, 2013).
However, increased board sizes are contributing factors leading to inefficient CEO
compensation packages (Conyon, 2014). Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) concluded
that a direct relationship exists between board size and CEO compensation; companies
would benefit from board size limits, which help eliminate possibilities of excessive
nonprofit executive compensation.
Executive compensation measurements. Numerous studies have examined
executive compensation in both profit and nonprofit organizations in relationship to
business performance using various dependent variables. Ferri and Maber (2013) focused
on compensation that is cash-based. Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) believed that
equity incentives provided the best variable. Pandher and Currie (2013) noted total CEO
compensation provided the best utility for their study. Ferri and Maber (2013) used

32
multiple regression analysis to examine relationships existing between cash (bonus &
salary) compensation and company performance. They used various independent
variables including CEO compensation, CEO cash pay, CEO total pay, salary, bonus, and
stock options. CEO total pay is the dependent variable because other forms of
compensation are difficult to translate. Using a panel regression, Ferri and Maber (2013)
concluded that CEOs’ total compensation has positive relationships with ROE and
market reaction.
Lin, Kuo, and Wang (2013) also examined company performance and its
relationship to CEO compensation. Lin et al. used regression modeling with CEO cash
compensation as the dependent variable and ROE, CEO tenure, CEO age, and company
size as independent variables. The data collected included 900 randomly sampled
publically traded U.S. companies between 2007 and 2010. Using the top five executives
from the sampled data, Lin et al. found that CEO compensation positively related to age,
tenure, and company size. Lin et al. also determined that there be a lack of relationship
between CEO compensation and ROE, the nonprofit version of return on investment.
Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013), Ferri and Maber (2013), Lin et al. (2013),
and Hou, Priem and Goranova (2014) found relationships statistically significant. These
significant relationships exist between CEO compensation, age, tenure, and company
size. Instead of using data from a single year, Gormley et al. examined company
performance and CEO compensation using data from 1990 to 2004. Their study uses data
from approximately 800 corporations and their CEOs’ compensation, listed by Forbes
magazine as among the 500 largest U.S. public companies. Gormley et al. used stock
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variance, assets, market-to-book ratio, and cash flow as independent variables in their
research. The dependent variables for their research included the various elements of
CEO compensation including annualized base salary, bonuses, stock options and awards,
and total CEO compensation. Via multiple regression analysis, the researchers
determined that risk-taking options relate to board structuring in for-profit companies.
Researchers Ferri and Maber (2013), Gormley et al. (2013), and Lin et al. (2013)
focused their research on executive compensation components. Other researchers have
focused on the entire CEO compensation packages. Pandher and Currie (2013) reasoned
that CEO total compensation provides an adequate measure as the dependent variable in
compensation because of performance research. The use of various forms of equity
compensation incorporated into CEO compensation packages, total compensation, has
become significant because of the combination of both cash and non-cash compositions
(Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2014). Pandher and Currie used an analytical framework
in which CEOs and stakeholders interact over the firms’ resource surplus based on
executive bargaining power. Pandher and Currie reported that CEOs of high-growth
companies would have higher equity compensation regarding variable cash pay (bonus)
and predicted the ratio of equity-to-bonus would increase sharply during bullish markets.
Pandher and Currie use total compensation as the dependent variable, Firm performance
exhibited no significant influence on for-profit CEO compensation.
CEO power. A common belief among agency theorists that controllership, over
which shareholders have no claim, transfers directly to the management of the company,
the CEOs (George, McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012; Speckbacher, 2012). Support for this
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assumption of managerial power is evident in research by Armstrong, Ittner, and Larker
(2012). CEOs possessing a significant influence on the board of directors could exercise
their influence on the structure and measurement initiatives leading to excess CEO
compensation.
The role of the CEO and its parallelism with the executive board allows direct
impact on their compensation package (Speckbacher, 2013). The CEO is traditionally a
member of the board of directors of the company in which he or she serves, allowing the
additional managerial power (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013). The compensation
committee hires local managers after considering similarities in governance, financial,
and investment policies (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2013). The likelihood of CEO
dominance over the board increases when CEOs are managing members of compensation
committees. Inevitably, the reduction in CEO compensation establishes dependence on
company performance.
Board members can have CEOs from other enterprises, which increase chances of
CEO compensation increases because of cronyism (Faleye, 2011). Lim (2015) examined
board vigilance, another perspective of the pay-for-performance itinerary reflecting
linkage from shareholders’ best interest straight to CEO salary and compensation
packages. The results of the study conducted by Lim indicated the lack of managerial
power’s existence.
Lunenburg (2012) argued that acquiring managerial control allows influence over
compensation in which the organization pays them. The board of directors uses an
optimal contracting theory to determine the alignment of CEO compensation and the
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creation of shareholder value (Galle & Walker, 2014). The arrangements present are
evident as positive gains in the stock market (returns) relate to the long-term CEO equity
rewards (Cai & Walkling, 2011). Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) stated that CEOs with
abilities exceeding those of the average executive typically receive larger compensation
packages in both nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
Managerial power exists when CEOs have autonomy to extract excessive pay
(rent) from the organization via the board of directors’ influence (Garner & Harrison,
2013). Lunenburg (2012) concluded that CEOs who influence board decisions had the
managerial power to enable the pay structure creation, which compensation committees
should control through governance. Precisely, a CEO’s board influence can affect the
compensation process in establishing contracts, eliminating the effectiveness of
measuring pay-for-performance that constitutes compensation packages (Newton, 2015).
Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012) indicated that board independence mitigates
managerial extraction of rents (pay) via excessive compensation through its governance
and practices.
CEO incentives. Using sample data from 2000 through 2007 associated with
executive compensation, Elsilä, Kallunki, Nilsson, and Sahlstrom (2013) concluded that
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between CEO incentives and
firm performance. The increasing use of stock and stock options granted to CEOs are
major factors contributing to the positive correlation between firm performance and CEO
compensation (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). The influence of debt levels in each organization
also ensures the use of stock options as compensation for CEOs. Alderson and Berker
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(2012) present a valid argument stating that decreases in debt levels are because of CEO
stock options, which increase when they are a proponent of total CEO compensation.
However, complications arise when attempting an alignment of CEO incentives
and shareholder interest in ways that increase innovation, which increases the pay-forperformance agenda of corporations and their respective CEOs (Zhu & Westphal, 2014).
Sheikh (2012) examined the numerous boards of directors of corporations, finding some
compensation methodologies in which the boards should use. Initially, Sheikh argued
increased innovations within firms have significant correlations with CEO incentive pay.
Sheikh noted the types of tools each board used as they provided numerous correlation
levels for firm growth and innovation. Sheikh also found that unvested options and 2013
awards provided the most significant form of influence on CEO behavior to compare
vested options and those previously granted. Consequently, boards of directors continued
use of stock options to align CEO incentives with shareholder interest proves beneficial.
Unintended consequences can arise when the compensation committee introduces
incentive components to CEO compensation packages such as earnings management.
Earnings management is a strategy that some executives use to control the value of
company stock (Hsieh, Bedard, & Johnstone, 2014). Stock options create an alignment of
CEO interest and those interests of the shareholders. The alignment relates to the
performance of firm stock prices, which induces CEOs to pursue wealth-creating
activities. Using regression modeling, Boone et al. (2011) examined equity incentives
used on CEO compensation packages. Noted in their study is the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 (SOX), firms are using equity incentives as a primary tool to
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align CEO behavior and shareholder interest. After the implementation of SOX,
executive compensation incentives align with risk management and earnings accuracy
(Boone et al., 2011).
With increased financial oversight and regulation, increasing the chances of legal
repercussions influence decisions about incentives for CEOs (Bai, Hsu, & Krishnan,
2014). Increased oversight because of regulatory changes directly influences the
executive compensation structure. Bereskin and Cicero (2013) noted the since the 1995
Delaware Supreme Court Ruling prosecutors have strengthened ability to target
company’s management. CEOs can take less risk for their firms by pursuing those
projects that have little net present value. As it correlates to CEO compensation, SOX
reduces risk-taking by reducing equity incentives in both for-profit and nonprofits
(Hostak, Lys, Yang, & Carr, 2013; Hsieh, Bedard, & Johnstone, 2014).
Firm Performance
Ding, Jia, Wilson, and Wu (2014) argued that the compensation committee of
each corporation should arrange compensation packages as dependent upon the
company’s market performance. Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick, and Coleman (2012) and
Hou, Priem, and Goranova (2014) similarly argued that boards of directors should create
incentivized compensation packages aligning with the interest of shareholders. The board
of directors, which determines executive compensation, should ensure the alignment of
executive and shareholder interest using long-term equity-based incentives (Takacs
Haynes et al., 2014). The alignment of financial incentives, mainly stock, influences
managerial decisions to parallel those of shareholders. The board of directors can
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establish an aligned agenda by issuing company stock as a form of executive payment
(Frankforter, Becton, Stanwick, & Coleman, 2012). Martin, Gomez-Mejia, and Wiseman
(2012) noted ownership of equity by executives encourages managerial decisions that
increase shareholder wealth and positively influence long-term business performance.
Problems exist with the idea of CEO compensation alignment with the interest of
shareholders using stock awards (Haynes, Cambpell, & Hitt, 2014). First, the CEO may
seek riskier activities that contribute to the long-term performance of the firm. Such
decisions of the CEO can increase substantial risk in pursuit of compensation that results
from the firms’ stock performance (Lim & McCann, 2013). As the use of stock
compensation increases, chief executives increasing the business risk also seek to
increase their personal wealth tied to company performance (Brick, Palmon, & Wald,
2012). Increasing returns for investors (shareholders) is a critical component of CEO
success. The executives who can produce returns exceeding expectations reflect
shareholders’ interest (Banker et al., 2013).
Prevost, Devos, and Rao (2013) noted CEO financial returns are highly dependent
on the firm and its performance. Kolev et al. (2014) documented an increase of 614% in
real dollars paid to CEOs using equity-based compensation incentives. Aligning CEO
compensation packages with shareholder interests create a positive financial return
benefit to the firm (Cowen, King, & Marcel, 2015). Accounting measurements provide
the most relevant tool for analyzing CEO compensation using the companies’ return on
equity (ROE). ROE illustrates, by using numerical information, ratios relating to change
of the past, current, and future firm performance (Nizam & Hoshino, 2015).
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The more market share that a company can capitalize, the better the chances that
CEO compensation will significantly increase. Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat (2014)
identified market capitalization as an important factor in a direct relationship with CEO
compensation, albeit not considering performance. Cho, Huang, and Padmanabhan
(2014) suggested that the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation
lacks existence. While CEO compensation is excessive in larger companies, in alignment
with previous studies, the exception is positive for firm revenue based upon the
relationship between CEO compensation and business performance. However, Cho et al.
limited their inquiry to Taiwanese firms invested in China from 2001-2009. Fich, Starks,
and Yore (2014) noted performance-based CEO compensation packages fail to respond
to the underperformance of the company.
Filatotchev, Jackson, and Nakajima (2013) studied current debates criticizing pay
packages and their assumed sensitivity to performance. Bradley (2013) concluded that no
correlation exists between any CEO compensation variables and company performance
variables using data from 2010 through data available in 2015. Bradley reported that
ROE lagged positive relations with other payments made to the CEO and was in direct
contradiction to the findings of Doucouliagos, Graham, and Haman (2012). Doucouliagos
et al. determined that company performance relate to CEO incentive pay.
Disagreements exist in the current literature relating to firm size and its influence
on CEO compensation packages within the financial services industry (Lin, Kuo &
Wang, 2013). The compensation packages awarded to CEOs considers firm size and
tenure, both of which influence the attractiveness of the compensation package (Lin et
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al.). Nonetheless, research suggests the relationship existing between CEO compensation
and firm size is delicate and relevant to the period used in the study (Bodolica &
Spraggon, 2015).
The current exercising of CEO compensation structuring results from the board of
directors aligning incentive packages with targeted financial accomplishments of the firm
(Matolcsy & Wright, 2011). The identified financial goals may vary from year to year in
comparison, which are results of economic conditions during that fiscal period. Also,
using data from 1994 to 2003 from the Fortune Global 500, Charfeddine, Bouaine, and
Smida (2011) conducted research using the least squares regression analysis. The
dependent variable used in this analysis was the financial accruals of CEO deferred
compensation. The independent variables consisted of firm performance, performance
predictions, market capitalization, and annual compensation. Charfeddine et al. argued
that CEO influence could lead to earnings management, which directly influences their
compensation levels. Charfeddine et al. illustrated the significance of all the variables
used, noting that, while annualized compensation is positive, a negative coefficient exists
for current and long-term performance. Consequently, the authors noted CEOs’
engagement in earnings management to improve annualized compensation. While
economic climate influences CEO compensation, CEOs can manage earnings in ways
that increase their compensation (Charfeddine et al.).
Sun, Wei, and Huang (2013) examined data from the U.S. property-liability
insurance industry from 2000 through 2006. The primary source of data for the efficiency
analysis is the regular annually filed financial statements extracted from the Compustat
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Executive Compensation Database. To ensure the integrity of compiled data all monetary
value variables were a direct reflection of real 2000 values using the consumer price
index (CPI). The selected population is firm executives, of which a sample of 322 exists.
Sun et al. then tested the relationship of compensation level (cash, bonus, and non-cash
compensation) and structure with efficiency measures, resulting in 31 firms mapping to
139 observations. Sun et al., using descriptive statistics and regression modeling,
identified a statistically significant positive correlation between CEO compensation and
firm efficiency. Sun et al. note executive compensation packages have significant
positive correlations with accounting returns. This notation is in agreement with previous
researchers (Banker et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2013; Sigler, 2011).
The market and accounting returns both directly influence CEO compensation.
Sun et al. (2013) found that, regardless of measurement, cost efficiency (CE) and revenue
efficiency (RE) relate to total CEO compensation. The results of this study are in direct
contradiction to previous studies (e.g., Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 2014) and findings
indicating a negative relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance,
demonstrating a need for further inquiry.
Firm performance measurement. In an examination of CEO compensation
packages, varieties of independent variables exist that provide utility for measuring firm
performance (Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012). Return on equity (ROE) is an accountingbased measurement derived by dividing the company’s income by its total equity. Sigler
(2011) and Banker et al. (2013) used ROE as the measurement tool for business
performance while examining the relationship between CEO compensation packages and
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ROE. The independent variables used in Sigler’s (2011) study included tenure, the beta
of the enterprise (specific risk), and ROE, and CEO compensation packages were the
only dependent variable. The population used for this study consisted of 280 publically
listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2009. In
conjunction with the results of previous research, Sigler concluded that a firm’s size is
the most important factor foretelling CEO compensation packages. The results indicate
the relationship between a companies' ROE and CEO compensation is positive and
significant.
The multiple linear regression models used by Banker et al. (2013) to measure
firm performance used stock performance and ROE as independent variables. The
dependent variables of the study included CEO equity compensation, bonus, and base
salary. The results of the study using data from 15,512 firms indicate that from 1993 to
2006 ROE and stock performance maintained a positive and significant relationship
between CEO equity compensation and CEO salary. Nonetheless, the relationship
between ROE and bonus are negatively related (Banker et al.).
Vemala, Nguyen, Nguyen, and Kommasani (2014) selected annual revenue and
net income as independent variables for firm performance measurement. The dependent
variables include CEO bonus and salary. Vemala et al. used time-series cross-sectional
regression to study the relationships within a sample of Fortune 500 firms listed in 2008
with 2241 observations. The results indicate that CEO compensation has a significant
positive relationship between firm size and firm performance. However, while some
companies are experiencing a crisis during which time their CEOs equity decrease, equity
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compensation increased during the post-crisis period (DeVaro & Fung, 2014). In
summary, the use of total revenue and ROE as independent variables during the
evaluation of accounting measurements reveals firm performance as a correlation to CEO
compensation packages.
Ozkan (2011) and Lin et al. (2013) both use modified variables that accounted for
the nonconformity among firms. The modifications to these studies are to variables that
include firm size, CEO age, and CEO tenure. The expanding influence of CEOs within
firms could result in higher CEO compensation packages because they may affect
compensation (Ozkan, 2011). Intrinsically, CEO age and tenure may contribute to the
reinforcement and allowance of enriched compensation packages (Ozkan, 2011). The
number of years the CEO has held his or her position is CEO tenure and age refers to the
age of the CEO. Lin et al. concluded firm size, when controlled by total assets, has a
significantly positive relationship between the incentives package included in CEO
compensation. Lin et al. also defined firm size as a measurement of companies’ total
assets.
Market performance, when used as a benchmarking tool, indicate the returns
shareholders experience increase while maintaining ownership of company stock (Banker
et al., 2013; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012). Market performance-based evaluations present
problems because CEO stock incentives and shareholder stock will experience similar
growth (Nyberg & Ployhart, 2012). Callan and Thomas (2014) used the multi-equation
system to conduct their investigation examining relationships between CEO
compensation and independent variables. The findings of their study conclude that
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corporate social responsibility is among executive salary determinants. The net
community benefits expense demonstrates corporate responsibility and needs further
research.
ROA. Investors and stakeholders use ROA as a metric to measure management’s
ability to generate earnings while effectively using its assets (Nulla, 2013). ROA
measures an organization’s ability to control expenses and use assets to generate revenue
(Gapenski & Pink, 2011). Nulla (2013) noted the user of the calculation’s divides the
firm’s change in net assets for the period by average total assets, resulting in a
percentage.
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) noted the importance of ROA and its contribution to
firm policies. Researchers examine the banking industry regarding how ROA contributes
to the banking policies and practices of banks on a globalized level. Companies that use
ROA as a basis for policy implementation are illustrating their ability to produce revenue
without overextending the firm (Colquit, Crutchley, & Swidler, 2012). The investors or
stakeholders of a corporation are confident in the firms’ actions.
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) examined ROA and relationships existing with
CEO compensation. Their research indicated that managers who exude confidence
generate a higher ROA than those that do not. The researchers also suggest that the
industries in which firms operate are fundamental to the CEO’s success. The ROA is a
factor that has relations to CEO compensation packages (Pathak, Hoskisson, & Johnson,
2014), providing its necessity as a variable for this study.
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Younis, Liu, and Forgione (2013) examined the turbulent marketplace in the
hospital industry creating threats to teaching hospitals’ financial viability. The
researchers conducted an in-depth analysis of ROA and leadership structure. In their
sample of 219 hospitals, the researchers concluded that the cost structure, along with
executive salaries, is significantly associated with the hospitals’ performance. Harrison,
Spaulding, and Mouhalis (2015) noted that hospitals engaged in teaching practices need
to manage their allocated resources and investments in fixed capital that support business.
Clark, Murphy, and Singer (2014) examined the role by which executive
leadership influences firm performance. While various governance factors that influence
executive agenda exist, the researchers note ROA varies within the nonprofit and forprofit firms. The ROA of a nonprofit firm is substantially higher than that of the for-profit
firm. The data from 100 firms indicated a ROA mean of 2.452 and 0.534 for nonprofit
and for-profit firms respectively. The higher mean indicates a focus on ROA while the
lower indicates that for-profits may concentrate their efforts on return on equity (ROE).
Harris (2014) conducted similar research that examined the board of directors’ influence
on nonprofit performance, specifically ROA. Although a limited study, there is evidence
that supports the influence of board characteristics. The characteristics include such items
as diversity and expertise. The improved nonprofit performance is the result of specific
board characteristics, as indicated by statistical calculations of this study.
Surplus revenue. The terms, surplus revenue or net change in assets, reflect the
difference between revenue and expenses and apply to profit and nonprofit organizations
(Chikoto & Neely, 2013). Surplus revenue in nonprofit organizations is the equivalent of
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profit in for-profit organizations (Hamann & Bezboruah, 2013). Novy-Marx (2013) noted
the definition of surplus revenue as the excess revenue generated by a firm after
subtracting its cost of goods sold and other operating expenses. Income generated during
its business operating process is the foundation of its surplus revenue (Bowman,
Tuckman, & Young, 2012). When completing the IRS Form 990, the accountant must
classify revenue into the following categories: contributions and grants, (b) program or
patient revenue, (c) investment activities, and (d) other revenue (IRS, 2014). The IRS
requires the accountant to classify expenses into three categories including: (a) program
service expenses, (b) management and general expenses, and (c) fundraising expenses.
The calculation of revenue minus expenses represents a change in net assets and reflects
the profitability of the organization (Gapenski & Pink, 2011).
Leary and Roberts (2014) investigated surplus revenue and its relationship to the
economic policy of a company. The research examined the influence of peer companies
and their surplus revenue within a business. The researchers note the effects of peer
influence were necessary for capital structure. Essentially, the company will shape its
financial policies after reviewing competitors and their surplus revenue (Maarse,
Jeurissen, & Ruwaard, 2015). If the firm adheres to the completion and remains proactive
in its economic systems, they can better adapt and react to market conditions.
The compensation of CEOs is reliant on benchmarks set by the competitors of the
firm (Albuquerque, De Franco, & Verdi, 2013). This strategy used by the board of
directors reflects a firm’s self-serving behavior. While this contributes to higher CEO
compensation, it also contributes to the rewarding of unobserved CEO talent. However,
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observations show that the compensation packages reward CEOs for maintaining and
increasing surplus revenue (Speckbacher, 2013).
Net community benefits. The IRS has issued directives that require nonprofit
hospitals to pass organizational and operational tests to maintain their nonprofit status.
The directive is under sub-section 501(r) of the internal revenue code (Campbell, Smith,
& Hostetler, 2013). Included in the organizational test is the measure of community
benefits. The community benefits are the amount of uncompensated medical care
provided to their respective communities (Rubin, Singh, & Jacobson, 2013). This
requirement is important to the organization as not abiding by the requirement can result
in the IRS canceling the organization’s 501(c) (3) status.
The boards of directors of nonprofit hospitals make tough decisions that affect the
livelihood of the organization (Carman & Nesbit, 2013). The boards must decide if the
firm should forego its 501(c)(3) status by reducing the amount of uncompensated care
provided to the community. The board of directors can also modify the mission of the
organization so that it parallels a for-profit entity (Hazen & Hazen, 2012). Ideally, the
board members take an active role in the organization. If the board of directors does not
take an active role in the organization, they may not have valuable insight into the effect
of losing their 501(c)(3) status (Hazen & Hazen, 2012). De Andrade Costa (2014) noted
when the governance committee of a nonprofit hospital includes a member who is a
practicing physician; the governance committee is more insightful into policies and
regulations regarding uncompensated care. The practicing members may provide
valuable insight including legal ramifications, fiscal concerns, and medical expertise.
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Affordable Care Act standards requiring community benefits have increased CEO
strategies to maintain nonprofit status (Day, Himmelstein, Broder, & Woolhandler,
2015). Such strategies include using loopholes such as joint ventures (Pan, 2013).
Executives use loopholes in the U.S. tax code to reduce expenses, giving the appearance
of better performance and increased community benefits expense (Leroux, 2012). The
board of directors may take particular interest in the IRS’ community benefits
requirement as it may change the business model if the revocation of the nonprofit status
occurs and illustrating a need for a further scholarly investigation.
Firm Compensation Strategy
Researchers often examine the existence of any relationships between
performance-based compensation packages and firm performance (Gordon & Fischer,
2014; Grigoroudis, Orfanoudaki, & Zopounidis, 2012). Chen and Jermias (2014)
examined executive compensation literature and its correlation to firm strategy, using a
sample pool of 194 S&P firms within the manufacturing industry. They found that
differential product firms use higher performance-linked compensation packages than
cost-leadership companies. The results of the study also indicated a positive relationship
between strategy and remuneration. If the executive compensation structure and firm
strategy are not in harmony, the performance of the company is negatively affected
(Abor, 2015).
The human characteristics of executives also contribute to the success or failure of
a business. O’Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman (2014) observed executives who
exhibit narcissistic traits, and their potential to influence firm strategy and performance.
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Such characteristics can have a direct effect on the ability to produce a profit or generate
excess revenue in the case of nonprofits (Speckbacher, 2013). The executives who exhibit
more narcissistic behaviors tend to have longer tenure within their firms. The same highly
compensated executives receive higher direct compensation (salary and bonus), higher
equity, and larger discrepancies between themselves and other executives. This nonperformance-based compensation creates an environment where the executives receive
financial rewards even if the firm fails to meet performance standards.
The boards of directors of organizations examine the human capital that
executives bring to help determine compensation packages. Peng, Sun, and Markoczy
(2015) noted international experience and political ties have emerged as potential drivers
of executive compensation. Executives with international experience bring a globalized
view on business to an organization. Those with political ties, such as an ex-Senator, can
help an organization navigate confusing laws. Executives, executive human capital, and
corporate governance influence an organization's strategy.
Wellens and Jegers (2014) noted the influence of legislation on organizational
strategy. Personal political views, beliefs, and affiliations are also contributors to an
executive’s motivations and decisions while bearing the risk of the firm. Chin et al.
(2013) examined political conservatism and liberalism regarding the corporate
responsibility companies’ exhibit, whereby a conservative executive controls the
company is far less than their liberal counterparts. The liberal executives exhibit social
responsibility on a grander scale than their counterparts. Chin et al. noted political
ideologies correlate to firm strategies.
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If the leaders fail to meet performance standards, it may be in the firm’s best
interest to refocus its programs, or change its strategy. Pathak, Hoskisson, and Johnson
(2014) examined such changes and their influence on executive compensation. The
authors indicated that the board of directors and the executives acceded to uncertainties
resulting from the strategic change. The institutions sampled for the study are likely
“settle up” with the executives, or compensate them for their risk-taking and effort during
the transitional period within the firm. The findings also suggest the use of prior
performance, industry dynamism, and corporate governance as moderators of the
restructuring relationship.
Executive compensation is also a primary indicator in studies examining firm
innovation (Akingbola & van den Berg, 2013). Executives are more motivated to pursue
innovative strategies when compensation links to performance (Baranchuk, Kieschnick,
& Moussawi, 2014). The compensation link alongside agency theory predicts that
executives’ behavior will be in the best interest of the shareholders as their wealth is also
a derivative of performance. The strategic objectives of the firm may drive the company,
but its innovative capacity exhibits the ability to influence firm strategy.
Although most research has examined the influence of executive compensation on
firm strategy, there are limited studies illustrating the influence on family-owned
businesses. van Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, and Heugens (2015) suggested that family
firms outperform their public counterparts. The strategic objectives of a family business
are less complex than public companies and are more flexible. A family-owned business
can adopt or change strategy more rapidly than a public company. The smaller entity
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exhibits a flexibility that larger organizations do not have. The ability to have a proactive
marketing strategy plan provides firms the ability to address changes in their respective
product offerings market.
In nonprofit organizations, the boards of directors’ election of primary executives
influence firm strategies (Ben-Ner & Ren, 2013). Zhu, Wang, and Bart (2014) noted
scholarly research and business view strategy influence within the organization from
different perspectives. An investigation of 217 for-profits and 156 nonprofit
organizations in Canada indicated that active boards of directors play equal parts in
strategy implementation and execution. The board members’ inclusion in major decisionmaking processes ensures that strategies are in alignment with company mission and
executive compensation.
Eldenburg and Gaertner (2015) argued that although highly compensated,
executives assume the risk while running an organization. Senior executives use human
resource management practices as a strategy to manage their human capital (Slocum, Lei,
& Buller, 2014). The efficient management of human resource components of an
organization is critical to strategy and mission accomplishment. Human resource
components within most organizations understand the complexity of human capital
management. Executive decisions for an organization include aspects of human capital
management (Grigoroudis et al., 2012). A lack of inclusion of human capital ideologies
may negatively influence the company’s profit or excess revenue. The opportunity exists
to examine executive compensation compared to excess revenue.
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Firm Sustainability
Kurucz, Colbert, and Marcus (2013) noted ideas of creating a sustainable
environment has been at the forefront of the managerial agenda since 1960. Although
executive compensation provides the basis in which sustainable solutions are born, it also
encourages ethical decisions by senior managers. Cumming, Hou, and Lee (2014) noted
creating sustainable growth required external financing development, governance, and
institutional reform. The boards of directors of organizations may use institutional reform
and external funding elements as important tools while creating executive compensation
packages. Maas and Rosendaal (2015) sampled 490 public firms from 11 countries and
different business sectors. The long-term and short-term targets of the companies
provided content from an environmental, social, or combined point of view. The results
suggested that an average of 33% of the firms used sustainable targets when determining
executive compensation since 2010. The objectives of the executives are typically shortterm and focus on social issues. Industries more inclined to include sustainable targets are
those that produce toxins in the environment.
Other forms of sustainability include economic, legal, and philanthropic. To
create profits or excess revenue, the executives must be economically responsible. The
term economic responsibility refers to the primary agenda of the executives: turning a
profit. Ims, Pedersen, and Zsolnai (2014) provided instances where managers’
performance resulted in negative economic activity for firms, because of relying on the
ever-increasing levels of executive compensation. The resulting negative performance
associated with executive compensation is a debilitating factor for sustainability. The
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executives within a firm are liable for their actions when it results in legal repercussions
against the entity. Uduji (2014) observed that management handles the context in which
executive efficiency is at optimal levels within the organization. Board members should
be concerned that executives are not cutting corners and taking shortcuts that could result
in legal action against the company. If the executives take unethical shortcuts, they are
jeopardizing themselves and the reputation of the business, creating trouble and attracting
unethical investors (Stevens, 2012).
The final form of sustainability is the firm’s philanthropic ability. The
philanthropic activities of the firm can lower its tax liability; however, operating using
agency theory creates a problem for executives (Masulis & Reza, 2015). The problem is
that when executive compensation links to performance (profit/excess revenue),
executives may thwart the philanthropic efforts of the firm as their wealth is dependent
upon performance. The other item considered is the tax rate of the company. If the firms’
tax rate is astronomical, it may be in their best interest to become philanthropic to reduce
their tax liabilities. On the other hand, if their tax liabilities are minimal, performancebased incentives may produce heavy incentives for executives although the community
benefits provision exist. A thorough examination of relationship existing may contribute
to efficient business practices.
Transition and Summary
Section 1 of this study began with an introduction to the problem of boards of
directors’ limited knowledge of executive compensation packages and their relationship
to firm performance. I elaborated on the problem of board members not knowing
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relationships existing between financial performance, profit, and net community benefits
expense. Subsequently, I detailed the purpose of this study, its value to the business;
contribute to effective business practices and the potential for social change. There is an
explanation of the available research methods and details on why the quantitative method
is best for this study.
The assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of Section 1 entailed an
explanation of the agenda. The assumptions conveyed were items assumed correct but
lack hard data for support. The limitations of the study detailed those influences outside
of my control. The delimitations are those items that the researcher has chosen not to
include for various reasons. The significance of this study and its implications for social
change proceeds the final portion of Section 1.
In the closing segment of Section 1 is the review of the professional and academic
literature. This review began with a detailed history of agency theory, the guiding theory
for this study, as well as two alternative theories and reasons why they were not sufficient
for this study. I explored executive compensation, its history and its application to
business practices in 2015. The literature review leads to firm performance, which may or
may not relate to the compensation packages awarded to executives. The literature review
provided an overview of the executive compensation topic as well as its weaknesses,
which I used to justify this topic.
In section 2 of this study, I described the primary elements of this research project
such as my role as a researcher, the research method & design, maintaining an ethical
study, and the techniques for data collection, analysis, and maintaining study validity. In
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Section 3 of this study, I provided an additional overview of the study before I presented
the findings. I conveyed the findings to professional practice and implementation for
social change. The final portion of Section 3 includes my recommendation for action,
future studies, reflections and study conclusions.
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Section 2: The Project
In the context of academic research, there is continual interest in the salaries of
executives and their relationships with organizational strategies (Hermalin & Weisbach,
2012). The strategies used to optimize administrative agendas are products of a board of
directors, which implements performance-based compensation initiatives. An incentive
package correctly aligned with shareholder interest in for-profit organizations rewards
executives who produce positive financial results for their respective company (Sigler,
2011). The results of this research may be useful to boards of directors of NPHs to
recognize relationships existing between ROA, change in net assets, net community
benefits expense, and executive compensation in NPHs. In this section of the study, I
address important issues along with research design and method.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. The population
for this study was U.S. NPHs that met the following criteria: (a) provide short-term acute
care, (b) classified as urban by Medicare, and (c) have more than 250 patient beds. The
independent variables for this study included (a) financial performance as measured by
ROA, (b) net profit as measured by the change in net assets, and (c) the total dollar
amount of net community benefits expense. The dependent variable was AEC, including
bonuses. I normalized the change in net assets, community benefits expense, and
compensation by including ADC as a controlling independent variable. Stanowski and
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Lynn (2015) indicated that ADC accurately portrays hospital size. Contributions from
this study may encourage a change in business practice through NPH governance
committees pinpointing proper incentive packages for executives. Social change from
this study may include decision-making persons using the results to establish appropriate
executive compensation packages that align with company performance to provide a
stable level of health care services to the public while improving the urban economy.
Role of the Researcher
The role of the researcher in the data collection process is to collect and analyze
data to draw conclusions (Szyjka, 2012). My experience with the subject was minimal.
Although I was familiar with accounting terms and concepts, I had not worked in the
NPH industry. Researchers need to remain unbiased and address possible ethical
dilemmas before they arise (Pickard, 2013). A researcher needs to be conscious of
potential ethical dilemmas while conducting research (Halse & Honey, 2014; Laukkanen,
Suhonen, & Leino-Kilpi, 2015). To assist in this goal, the Belmont Report (1979)
provided guidelines that researchers must adhere to while conducting research on human
subjects. I used secondary, nonhuman data for this study; the requirements of the
Belmont Report did not apply to my research.
Participants
Similar to Boyer, Gardner, and Schweikhart (2012), I used publicly available
secondary data for this study. Although the Belmont Report (1976) noted respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice when using human participants, I did not use human
participants. I did remain mindful of the Belmont Report’s requirements in the event
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human contact did occur. Schulman et al. (2013) noted that secondary data provides
utility to researchers for various subjects because of its accessibility. Fanning (2014)
noted that researchers save time when using secondary data. I used secondary data in an
electronic format that was available from National Center for Charitable Statistics
(NCCS).
Research Method and Design
Academic researchers may choose from three types of methods while conducting
their inquiry: (a) qualitative, (b) quantitative, and (c) mixed-methods (Raich et al., 2014).
Gioia et al. (2012) noted that although each method requires different forms of samples
and data, researchers use the most appropriate method that addresses their research
questions. For this study, I chose the quantitative method because the specific business
problem, purpose statement, and research question addressed a quantitative relationship.
Also, I was interested in quantitative data.
Method
Hannes, Heyvaert, Slegers, Vandenbrande, and Van Nuland (2015) described
qualitative research as exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups
ascribe to a social or human problem. Gioia et al. (2012) noted that qualitative research
methods are exploratory tools researchers used to gain an understanding of underlying
reasons, opinions, and motivations. Qualitative research methods provide maximized
utility for investigators seeking to explore participants’ points of view (Wilson et al.,
2014). Santos, Black, and Sandelowski (2014) noted that qualitative research requires
human participants. I used numerical data generated by humans for this study and did not
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attempt to understand how individuals or groups interpret executive compensation. For
that reason, I found no utility in the qualitative research method.
The mixed-methods approach provides researchers the tools needed to gain an
understanding of a phenomenon while simultaneously allowing quantification (Boeije,
Van Wesel, & Slagt, 2012). Mixed methods research combines both qualitative and
quantitative methods (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). Venkatesh et al. (2013) indicated that
mixed methods allow investigators to examine a phenomenon while collecting supporting
data. The results of the mixed methods study may provide subjectivity and objectivity
simultaneously argued Venkatesh et al. Due to the cost of attendance at Walden
University and my time constraints because of diminishing financial support for higher
education; I did not find any utility using the mixed methods research design.
Roos, Thakas, Sultan, Leeuw, and Paulus (2014) noted that quantitative research
enables researchers to examine numerical data. Similar to Hammer and Berland (2014), I
sought to quantify the relationship between a set of variables. Similar to Zuo and Xing
(2014), I used the quantitative research method to test my hypothesis. The quantitative
method was ideal for this study because quantitative data is less detailed than qualitative
or mixed-methods. Additionally, quantitative research designs are not reliant upon
responses from participants.
Research Design
Hagger and Lyszczynska (2014) argued that the links between all elements of
research are products of the design. Vannest and Ninci (2015) identified three available
quantitative designs: (a) experimental, (b) descriptive and (c) correlational. Simons,
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Smith, and White (2014) noted that experimental designs involve the manipulation of
variables to measure change. Huang, Liu, Song, and Keyal (2014) noted that
experimental research designs are susceptible to human error. I did not manipulate any
data; therefore, I found no utility in the experimental design.
Tastan et al. (2014) noted that descriptive designs are useful when observing,
describing, or documenting. Tonetti and Palmer (2012) and Ploutz-Snyder, Fielder, and
Feiveson (2014) argued that descriptive research is useful to identify the mean, mode,
and standard deviation. I did not observe, describe, or document; therefore, I found no
use for the descriptive design. I did not seek to understand the descriptions of variables.
Zuo and Xing (2014) noted that researchers use correlational studies to examine
relationships between two or more variables. Schoenbaum, Esber, and Iordanova (2013)
noted that correlational research enables researchers to measure the intensity of
relationships among variables. Hasan, Bègue, Scharkow, and Bushman (2013) suggested
that correlational designs are intricate in examining issues not addressed during
experiments. Because I examined secondary numerical data, the correlational design was
most beneficial to this study.
Population and Sampling
The population for this study was U.S. NPHs that met the following criteria: (a)
provide short-term acute care, (b) classified as urban by Medicare, and (c) have more
than 250 patient beds. This population demonstrated alignment with the overarching
research question addressing the relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial
performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits
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expense, and executive compensation. Durand (2013) and Landau and Stahl (2013) noted
that an appropriate sample size is important to produce valid results.
To have a controllable sample like the one used by Bhatta, Karki, and Aryal
(2015), I used a nonprobabilistic purposive sampling technique. Milroy, Wyrick, Bibeau,
Strack, and Davis (2012) noted that nonprobability sampling does not involve random
selection. Barratt, Ferris, and Lenton (2014) described purposive sampling as a method
that allows the rejection of data that does not fit a particular profile. Barratt and Lenton
(2014) asserted that nonprobability sampling allows researchers to use various criteria to
create manageable samples while being cost efficient. Barratt et al. noted the primary
advantage of using nonprobability sampling is that there is no need for generalization as a
sample may not truly exemplify the generalized population. I chose to use the
nonprobabilistic purposive sampling technique because I could limit the sample
population based on defined criteria. Using the defined criteria of U.S. acute care urban
hospitals with more than 250 beds resulted in a purposeful sample of 120 hospitals.
While I chose a nonprobability purposeful sampling technique, I also considered
but rejected a probability sample. Otto, Otto, and Scholl (2013) noted that an important
advantage of a simple random sample includes the ease of assembling the sample. Dunn,
Wilson, Nicholls, and Broadhurst (2012) mentioned the sample is a representative of the
population. Bornstein, Jager, and Putnick (2013) noted that an unbiased random selection
and representative sample are significant when drawing conclusions from the sample
results. Bornstein et al. argued that a major disadvantage of purposeful sampling is that
the sample does not represent the population in which drawn from. I was not interested in

62
a representative sample of the entire population. I was only interested in those hospitals
that aligned with my research question.
Using a purposeful sample of 120 NPHs exceeded the minimum needed. Daniel
(2012) noted that although a purposeful sample does not follow probability requirements
for sample size, the sample size requirements for probability samples provides a suitable
point of reference for determining the sample size. Power et al. (2012) supported the
G*Power 3 ability to achieve satisfactory power. I used G*Power 3 and determined that
the minimum sample size to achieve a power of .95 was 89. The purposeful sample of
120 hospitals was sufficient for this study. After three outlier removals, I used a sample
of 117, which still exceeded 89.
Ethical Research
Before initiating data collection or analysis activities at Walden University,
doctoral candidates must submit their proposed studies to the institutional review board
(IRB). Johnson et al. (2014) mentioned that an institution’s IRB ensures that doctoral
candidates follow applicable laws, professional standards, and institutional requirements.
Savickas and Porfeli (2012) argued that researchers have an obligation to demonstrate the
reliability of their study.
Like Harrison and Thornton (2014), I chose to access the databases of the NCCS.
The Internet networks providing access to NCCS included my home internet connection
and that of my current employer, Case Western Reserve University. Comparable to
Arpaci, Kilicer, and Bardakci (2015), I stored data for this study on Google Drive, a
secure Web-based cloud storage service. The only people whom had access to the file
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were my doctoral study committee members and myself. Similar to Skulason,
Hauksdottir, Ahcic, and Helgason (2014) and in line with Walden University’s doctoral
study requirements, I will destroy the data 5 years after study conclusion.
The protection of susceptible populations is a researcher’s responsibility (Guta,
Nixon, & Wilson, 2012). In similar fashion to Taljaard et al. (2013), I used secondary
data for this study. I did not use human participants directly and did not require
confidentiality agreements or consent forms. Similar to Damianakis and Woodford
(2012), I removed identifying information for organizations and individuals before I
assigned each a sequential number starting at one. The Walden University Institutional
Review Board approval number for this study was 02-25-16-0436814.
Instrumentation
Barley and Moreland (2014) observed that instruments are items used in research
to collect data, such as surveys, interviews, and experiments. I did not use any data
collection instruments. I used only secondary data as described by Colbert, Sereika, and
Erlen (2013) for this study. All data retrieved for variable analysis in this study came
from NCCS and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services in the alphabet and
numerical formats. Omair (2015) noted the significance of numerical data for quantitative
studies; I found numerical data appropriate for this study. In the event any data was
missing, I retrieved missing data directly from the NPHs website because IRS 990
information was publicly available. Similar to Harris, Petrovits, and Yetman (2015), I
used contact information from the Form 990 to contact the NPH and gather missing data
while keeping information about human contact confidential. I did not use an instrument
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for this study; therefore, I was not concerned with reliability and validity issues
associated with an instrument.
Data Collection Technique
I collected data for this study electronically from NCCS and the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services in a Microsoft Excel format via requests on their
websites. If data were unavailable electronically, I called the NPH and requested an
electronic copy of its IRS 990 report to be sent via e-mail. IRS regulation mandates that
all IRS Form 990 reports be open to public inspection (IRS, 2015). I collected all IRS
Form 990 information for the 2013 reporting year from NPH organizations within the
study sample. I chose the year 2013 because it overlapped the implementation of the
community benefits provision as mandated by the IRS (Day et al., 2015). That year was
ideal because some organizations may not have completed their 2014 forms, as auditing a
robust organization takes time. The 2013 data provided adequate data to determine the
relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial performance as measured by ROA,
change in net assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and executive
compensation.
Abzug, Olbrecht, Sabrin, and DeLeon (2016) noted IRS Form 990 information is
publically available and includes information reported to the IRS. I used the IRS Form
990 to collect ROA, net profit, total net community benefits expense, and AEC. Part I of
the IRS Form 990 is a summary that lists revenue, expenses, and net assets (Appendix A).
I calculated the ROA by dividing the net income by average total assets. The change in
net assets is a calculation consisting of revenues minus expenses. The current year
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revenue is on line 12 of the Part I Summary. The current year expenses are on line 18 of
Part I. The revenue and expenses are also located on line 12 of Part VIII Statement of
Revenue (Appendix B), and line 25 of Part IX Statement of Functional Expenses
(Appendix C). As a means of verification, I performed calculations equaling line 19 of
the Part I Summary. The total net community benefits expense is on line K of Section 7
column E of the Schedule H of the IRS Form 990 in Part I (Appendix D). The executive
compensation data are from part IRS Form 990 Part VII (Appendix E) listing primary
executives, their pay, and average hours worked. I accumulated the total salaries of all
executives disclosed and divided by the number of disclosed executives to arrive at the
average of executive compensation. I normalized the change in net assets, community
benefits expense, and compensation by including ADC as a controlling independent
variable. Total hospital census was publicly available directly from the Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). After acquiring 2013 census, I divided each
census number by total days in the year.
An advantage of this data collection method, as noted by Leon, Stoner, and
Dickson (2015), was that correlational studies provide superior insight. Litvak et al.
(2012) argued an important advantage be that correlational studies examine issues that
cannot be studied using a qualitative approach. A significant disadvantage as mentioned
by Parise, Spence, and Ernst (2012) was that correlational studies do not indicate
causation.
Makwana and Rathod (2014) indicated that Microsoft Excel is an efficient tool for
storing, organizing, and comparing data. I retrieved data from NCCS and cms.gov
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through a request online. After opening the data in Microsoft Excel, the format, font,
sorting alphabetically by NPH name was next. Immediately after that, I included two
columns for the purpose of calculations to the right of the main dataset. In the first
column, the ROA calculation was a byproduct of dividing the net income by average total
assets. I calculated AEC by adding the total executive compensation and dividing the
total by the number of executives. Upon completion of the calculations, I copied the page
and pasted the values only into a new page. I imported the data into the statistical
package for the social sciences (SPSS). I then conduct a side-by-side comparison of
Excel data and SPSS data to ensure successful data importation. Torabi, Shirazi, Hajali,
and Monjezi (2013) noted the importance of verifying data input into SPSS. Once the
importation of data verification concluded, I organized the dataset using columns to
differentiate ROA, change in net assets, net community benefits, and executive
compensation.
Data Analysis Technique
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. The following
research question sought to address the relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial
performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits
expense, and executive compensation?
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RQ1: What is the relationship between urban U.S. NPH financial performance as
measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and
executive compensation?
The null and alternative hypothesis are:
Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant predictive relationship
between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community benefits expense,
and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant predictive
relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community
benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry.
After exploring varying means of data analysis, I decided to use a linear
regression model. The multiple regression analysis provides utility to researchers who are
examining numerous independent variables while attempting to establish relationships
with dependent variables (Agudo-Peregrina, Iglesias-Pradas, Conde-González, &
Hernández-García, 2014; Chong, 2013). Pearson’s correlation provides utility to
researchers seeking to establish a relationship between a single independent and
dependent variable (Metzger et al. 2013). To test the hypothesis of this study the multiple
regression analysis methods is optimal. The inclusion of descriptive statistics aids in
detailing material relating to scores, disparity, and ordinariness (Young et al., 2013).
Other techniques I considered but rejected included linear programming, crosscorrelations, and Cox regression. Linear programming is a mathematical function in
which efficiency measuring occur for best production levels (Tiemann & Schreyögg,
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2014). This method is not appropriate because I was not examining NPH efficiency or
best practices. Cross-correlation utility measures the similarities between two series as a
function of the lag of one about the other (Xu, Duan, Wu, & Zhou, 2013). This method
provides no utility because this study does not use multiple series of data. Lipton et al.
(2013) use a Cox regression model to investigate the effect of variables at the time events
occur. This method is useless because I was not examining time occurrence as a factor.
After collecting data for this study, I scrutinized the dataset for omitted or partial
data. Boyd and Crawford (2012) noted the importance of accurate information when
drawing conclusions that rely upon data. Similar to Girotra et al. (2014), I had to ensure
that all data fields are complete, discard, and replace those items not representative of a
complete piece of data to ensure proper sample size. Similar to Shin and Lee (2014), I
omitted the missing information because finding out why data is missing would consume
excessive amounts of time, and this study had limits on time because of financial
constraints.
Adamowski, Fung Chan, Prasher, Ozga-Zielinski, and Sliussarieva (2012) noted
using the multiple regression analysis methods one must rely on certain assumptions.
Type I and II errors occur when researcher’s fail to meet the assumptions of their chosen
analysis method (Bedeian, 2013). Francis (2012) mentioned that type I errors occur when
a true hypothesis rejection occur. Vinaixa et al. (2012) stated type II errors occur when
the acceptance of a false hypothesis happens.
Wakefield, Bickley, and Sani (2013) mentioned that common assumptions
include normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Wiedermann, Hagmann, and von Eye
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(2014) noted assumptions as normal distribution assume random variables have normal
distribution from the mean and asymmetric in a bell-shaped graph. Willis and Hyde
(2014) mentioned the possibility of inaccurate relationships attributed to abnormal data.
Similar to Price-Whelan et al. (2014) I used a histogram to identify outlying data points.
Similar to Welsh, Eschrich, Berglund, and Fenstermacher (2013), I performed data
cleansing and remove outlying data points.
Hopkins and Ferguson (2014) argued linearity assumption be that dependent
variables linearly relate to other coefficients within the model. Warton, Duursma, Falster,
and Taskinen (2012) mentioned a common method for testing the existence of linearity is
by plotting residuals on a graph. Vargha, Bergman, and Delaney (2013) stated SPSS
functionality provides a means to test for linearity. If the residuals are linear in fashion,
the data points distributions are close to a diagonal line. Duru, Bulut, and Yoshida (2012)
noted if the data is not linear, the researcher might need to adjust the data set.
The homoscedasticity assumption means that variance around the regression line
for all variables are the same (Hopkins & Ferguson, 2014). Violations of this assumption
use the Levene’s or Brown-Forsythe tests. The Levene’s test ensures that the variance
existing between two groups are true, meeting the requirement of a regression. A visual
scatter plot along with this method of testing ensured that regression analysis is optimal
for this study. Hopkins and Ferguson further argued that a violation of homoscedasticity
might produce a spurious regression.
The results of the descriptive statistics produced by the regression allow
generalizations from the sample to the population. Because the possibility exists that the
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sample may not epitomize the population, SPSS calculated the probability (p value). The
p value comparison is a predetermined SPSS standard. Green and Salkind (2014) noted
.05 as the research standard. G*Power 3 used the same alpha and p value of .95. The
proper effect size for this study was .15, or F=.15.
Numerous software packages are available to researchers for the purpose of
analyzing data including Statistical Analysis System (SAS), LIMDEP, Stata, and
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Abdel-Karim, 2014; SPSS). SPSS is a robust
statistical program used by other researchers conducting correlational analysis both
within and outside the university (Akin, Gulmez, Bozkurt, Nuhoglu, & Usta, 2014;
Anderson, Baylor, Eadie, & Yorkston, 2015; Block et al., 2014). Consequently, I chose to
use SPSS version 21 for this study. I examined data and in the sequence of stated
hypothesis, reported findings in a parallel manner, that supports the theoretical
framework of this study.
Study Validity
Lobo, Fisher, Peachey, Ploeg, and Akhtar-Danesh (2015) noted researchers’
responsibility to recognize the most appropriate data to collect for the study based on the
hypothesis and research questions. The quantitative research method enables researchers
to examine the relations of datasets to validate the purpose of the study (Morard, Stancu,
& Jeannette, 2012). SPSS software allows statistical testing so that the researcher can
accept or reject the hypothesis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).
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External and Internal Validity
Within the research paradigm, two types of validity exist: internal and external
(Price et al., 2012). The external validity of this study has urban NPHs, similar to Sigler
(2011) notation, operating in the same industry within the same geographical limitation
of the United States. I focused primarily on urban NPHs, and the results of this study may
not apply to the entire hospital industry. Consequently, the users of this study’s outcome
may implement the results at hospitals, both public and private. Nonetheless, the same
users should not generalize the results of this study to the hospital industry (specialized,
teaching, and clinics).
Henderson, Kimmelman, Fergusson, Grimshaw, and Hackam (2013) noted threats
to external validity include interaction, pre-testing, and multiple treatments and
interventions. Olbert et al. (2013) argued interaction occur if subjects are not selected
randomly from the population their characteristic may bias performance. Charlesworth,
Burnell, Hoe, Orrell, and Russell (2013) stated that pre-testing might cause a subject to
react more or less strongly to treatment if they are not pre-tested. Because I did not pretesting a survey instrument, this external threat was nonexistent. Funderburk, Kenneson,
and Maisto (2014) noted that generalization is limited when multiple treatments occur on
subjects. I did not administer multiple treatments in this study and eliminated this
external threat.
The requirement for internal validity is that researchers recognize if their results
are attributable to their hypothesis or another variable (Price, Palmer, Battista, & Ansari,
2012). Henderson, Kimmelman, and Ferguson (2013) noted history, instrumentation, and
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maturation as internal validity threats. Weeks, Clochesy, Hutton, and Moseley (2013)
noted studies taking repeat measures on subjects over time might likely affect by history.
In this study, there were no repeat measures on subjects because I was not using an
experimental design. Irvin and Kaplan (2014) stated instrumentation threats occur when
instruments change during the observation; however, I did not use an instrument, I am
collecting secondary data, and this threat’s concern did not apply. Maturation, as noted by
Irvin and Kaplan (2014) are natural changes that occur resulting from normal time
passage. There were no natural changes to data and consequently, no threat to maturation.
Statistical Conclusion Validity
The threat to internal validity is not valid for this study because this is a nonexperimental design. Khorsan and Crawford (2014) noted experimental research designs
manipulate cause while observing the outcome. Also noted during their research is the
need to observe whether cause-effect relates to variation. The methods of the experiment
to reduce the plausibility of other explanations for the effect. In the absence internal
validity concerns, a researcher must be aware of statistical conclusion validity (SCV)
threats (Kratochwill & Levin, 2014). SCV is a factor whereby a researcher reaches an
incorrect conclusion and relationships existing in a correlational study. Pigott, Williams,
and Polanin (2012) noted two main errors could occur: (a) concluding that a relationship
does not exist when it does, and (b) concluding that there is a relationship existing when
there is not. Numerous factors contribute to SCV. For the purpose of this study, I
explored (a) reliability of the instrument, (b) data assumptions, and (c) sample size in the
coming paragraphs.
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Instrumentation reliability. Cook, Brydges, Zendejas, Hamstra, and Hatala
(2013) noted the reliability of the collection device negatively influences the validity of
the study. Hott, Limberg, Ohrt, and Schmit (2015) mentioned that instruments must be
both valid and reliable. In this study, I did not use any instruments to collect the data.
Because I am using secondary data in this study, similar to Leidy et al. (2014), the
reliability of the instrument was not a primary concern. As previously noted in the
assumptions of this study, I assumed that NPHs reported accurate information to the
government.
Data assumptions. Warton et al. (2012) noted the data assumptions of multiple
regression analysis include many areas; two important areas researchers should always
test: (a) that the distribution of variables is normal, and (b) assumption of a linear
relationship between variables. The non-normal distribution of variables or outliers can
distort the actual value of the mean (Hannigan & Lynch, 2013). The outliers’
identification occur by using various visual inspection methods such as histograms,
frequency of distributions, or converting data into z-scores according to Jannigan and
Lynch (2013). In this study, I used a histogram to test for outliers. Rosner, Cook, Daniels,
and Falkner (2013) noted linearity assumption as the assumption that the relationship
between independent and the dependent variable is linear. To test this assumption, I used
the scatter plot feature in SPSS.
Sample size. For those researchers wishing to generalize their findings to a small
sample population, their sample size should be of a size that meets or exceeds the
significance level as Ilieva, Hook, and Farah (2015) noted. Button et al. (2013) noted
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studies with low statistical power have a reduced chance of detecting a true effect. In this
study, there was no attempt to generalize the results of the study to the health care
industry. I have used a purposeful sample technique, which restricts the ability to
generalize results. I conducted a power analysis using G*Power as a reference point to
compare experimental designs. Similar to Suresh and Chandrashekara (2012), I used a
.95% confidence interval that resulted in a minimum population of 89 for generalization.
The sample size of 120 used for this study exceeds the minimum required.
Transition and Summary
In Section 2 of this study, I expanded upon the quantitative research method and
applying the correlational design chosen for this study. I explained in detail the rationale
for selecting this quantitative approach versus qualitative or mixed methods and
experimental or quasi-experimental designs. I explained my role as a researcher and
addressed the need to remain unbiased, and ethical throughout the research process. Also
provided are the population details in which I chose the sample. Along with the technique
I used to collect, store, and analyze data, the internal and external validity concerns and
methods of mitigation convey. In Section 3, I present the results of statistical analysis,
along with an interpretation of the findings with applications to the hypothesis, research
question, and social change. In Section 3, I recommend ideas for action, future research,
and personal research reflections of this study, inclusive of a summary of conclusions.
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Section 3: Application for Professional Practice and Implications for Change
The proper alignment of financial incentives for executives is critical to the
survival of NPHs. In Section 1 of this study, I introduced the foundation of the study and
the gap in current research that examines net community benefits expense. In Section 2, I
described the steps performed to examine the relationships among the study variables. In
section 3, I present the results of my research and explain how the findings may influence
professional practice. The conclusion of this study focuses on implications for social
change and reflections on the doctoral study process.
Overview of Study
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets
(profit), net community benefits expense, and executive compensation. With increasing
costs and regulation of NPHs, boards of directors’ challenges include ensuring that
executive compensation aligns with organizational goals (Brandes et al., 2015). Kolev et
al. (2014) noted executive compensation alignment as a board strategy necessary for
survival. Boards of directors are primary influencers of executive compensation strategies
(Ben-Ner & Ren, 2013).
I collected data from NCCS, Guidestar, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid
Services. The independent variables for this study were (a) financial performance as
measured by ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), and (c) the total dollar amount of net
community benefits expense. The independent controlling variable was ADC. The
dependent variable for this study was executive compensation. The findings of this study
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may provide boards of directors’ financial insight in creating executive compensation
policies that align with organizational goals. When scrutinizing the relationship between
the variables of this study, I determined that a statistically significant relationship did
exist for the model; therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis and failed to reject the
alternative hypothesis. ROA, net assets, and total community benefits expense were good
tools when predicting executive compensation in 2013.
Presentation of Findings
Research Question and Hypotheses
The research question was the following: What is the relationship between urban
U.S. NPH financial performance as measured by ROA, change in net assets (profit), net
community benefits expense, and executive compensation? The study included three
independent variables: ROA, change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits
expense. The independent controlling variable was average daily census, and the
dependent variable was executive compensation. I conducted an in-depth examination of
current literature before I developed the research question and hypothesis.
Ferri and Maber (2013) and Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn (2013) acknowledged
the utility of regression analysis in their studies addressing executive compensation and
company performance. Similarly, I used regression modeling to determine the extent to
which relationships existed between the variables of this study. I used regression analysis
for this study to examine relationships between the variables (a) ROA, (b) change in net
assets (profit), (c) total community benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation. I
framed the testing of variables in the following hypothesis:
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Null hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant predictive relationship
between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community benefits expense,
and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry.
Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant predictive
relationship between (a) ROA, (b) change in net assets (profit), (c) net community
benefits expense, and (d) executive compensation within the U.S. urban NPH industry.
Descriptive Statistics
After examining the IRS 990 reports to determine whether the financial results
fairly represented results from continuing operations. I removed three financial reports
because the results contained material one-time gains or losses that skewed the financial
results. Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for the variables. The five most common
titles of executives included vice president of fund development, physician, chief
operating officer, president, and chief financial officer.
Table 1
Statistics of Sample Mean and Sample Standard Deviation
Average Executive
Compensation ($)
ROA (%)

M

SD

Min

Max

571,626

285,893

222,095

1,695,489

5.2

4.8

-4.82

21.81

Net Income (Profit) ($)

42,327,915 53,088,057 -27,342,855 401,639,442

Total Net Community
Benefits Expense ($)

41,550,196 35,371,949

ADC

320

185

5,499,381

267,170,077

110

1346
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To gain a further understanding of the relationship between variables, I completed
a correlational matrix for all variables, as illustrated in Table 2. The table includes the
Pearson correlation and one-tailed significance (p value). Although I did not use the
correlational matrix to test my hypotheses, the results provided an understanding of the
relationship among variables. All correlations were positive with the exception of the
relationship between AEC and ROA.
Table 2
Correlation Matrix

AEC
ROA
Net Income (Profit)
Pearson
Net Community
Correlation
Benefits
ADC
AEC
ROA
Net Income (Profit)
Net Community
Sig. (1Benefits
tailed)
ADC
AEC
ROA
Net Income (Profit)
Net Community
N
Benefits
ADC

AEC

ROA

Net Income
Net
(Profit)
Community
Benefits
.368
.441
.571
.046
1.000
.398

ADC

1.000
-.061
.368

-.061
1.000
.571

.441

.008

.411

1.000

.497

.654
.
.257
.000

.046
.257
.
.000

.398
.000
.000
.

.000
.000
.312
.000

1.000
.000
.465
.000

.000

.456

.000

.

.000

.000
117
117
117

.312
117
117
117

.000
117
117
117

.000
117
117
117

.
117
117
117

117

117

117

117

117

117

117

117

117

117

.654
.046
.398
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Assumptions Testing Results
Prior to testing the hypotheses, I examined the data for missing data, outliers, and
homoscedasticity and linearity violations. While there were no missing data, I discovered
and removed thee outliers from the initial sample of 120, resulting in a final sample of
117 financial statements. I then inspected the data for homoscedasticity and linearity
violations (Figure 1). The inspection indicated that none had occurred. Figures 2-5 show
partial regression plots illustrating the effect of adding each variable to the regression
model.

Figure 1. 2013 scatterplot for residuals.
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Figure 2. 2013 partial plot for ROA.

Figure 3. 2013 partial plot for net income (profit).
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Figure 4. 2013 partial plot for total net community benefits expense.

Figure 5. 2013 partial plot for ADC.
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Using normal probability plots (P-P) of the standardized residuals, I did not detect
violations of the normality assumption. Illustrated in Figure 6, the residual plotting is
near the normal line. Because all residuals are close to the line, there is reason to believe
that residuals are independent. There is no indication that autocorrelation occurs.

Figure 6. Normal P-P plot of residual standards.
As a further test of the data, I examined the potential for collinearity. As displayed
in Table 3, all tolerance values were below 1.0 and all variance inflation factor (VIF)
values exceeded 1.0. In addition, no correlations among independent variables were
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greater than 0.7 (Table 2). As explained by Moore (2014), when statistical results fall
within these benchmarks for tolerance, VIF, and correlation, the researcher can assume
no violations of multicollinearity exist for the data.
Table 3
Collinearity Statistics
Model

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance

VIF

ROA

.589

1.699

Net Income (Profit)

.464

2.155

Net Community Benefits

.652

1.534

ADC

.664

1.505

(Constant)

Inferential Results
I piloted a linear regression model to determine if a relationship existed between
the independent variables including ROA, change in net assets, and net community
benefits expense with the dependent variable average executive compensation and. I used
ADC as an independent controlling variable. The null hypothesis was that there was no
significant predictive relationship between ROA, change in net assets, net community
benefits expense, and executive compensation. The alternative hypothesis was that there
is a significant predictive relationship between ROA, change in net assets, net community
benefits expense, and executive compensation.
The model as a whole was able to significantly predict AEC, F (5,111) = 23.041,
p = .000, R2 = .509. The R2 (.509) value indicated that approximately 51% of variations in
AEC is accounted for by the linear combination of the predictor independent variables
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(see tables 4-6 for model summary). In the final model, the relationship between change
in net assets (beta= -.253, p=.004) and ROA (beta= .273, p=.006) with AEC was
significant at the .05 level. Total net community benefits did not show a significant
relationship with AEC (beta =.063, p=.449), which indicates that although a relationship
does exist the relationship is not statistically significant. Additionally, Droby et al. (2015)
noted that further t-test examination would result in erroneous conclusions. Thus, the
regression coefficients located in Table 7 may lead to future research.
My findings are similar to those produced by Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn
(2013), Ferri and Maber (2013), Lin et al. (2013), and Hou, Priem, and Goranova (2014)
who all found statistically significant relationships between executive compensation and
company performance. The most surprising find is the negative correlation between ROA
and AEC. Turner, Broom, Elliot, and Lee (2015) noted that NPHs often have restricted
funding that limit managerial behaviors, and consequently may accrue to future
managers. However, none of the previous research included ADC and net community
benefits expenses are variables. That there was no relationship between net community
benefit and AEC may suggest that boards of directors do not use metric to target
executive compensation. To ensure an in-depth examination of data, I examined the 117
hospitals, which represents 97.5% of the total proposed sample of 120 NPHs (Table 2).
Although there was a statistically significance to the model, I can conclude that boards of
directors’ will find the information useful as executive compensation packages align with
hospital objectives.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance
ANOVAa
Model

Sum of Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Regression

4.829E+12

5

9.658E+11

23.041

.000b

1 Residual

4.652E+12

111

41914348193

Total

9.481E+12

116

a. Dependent Variable: Average Executive Compensation
b. Predictors: (Constant), ADC, ROA, Total Net Community Benefits Expense, Net Income (Profit)

Table 5
Model Summary A
Model Summaryc
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

Change Statistics
R Square

F Change df1

Change
1

.714a

.509

.487

204729.94

.509

23.041

Table 6
Model Summary B

Model Summary
Model

Durbin-Watson
Change Statistics

1

df2

Sig. F Change

111a

.000

1.849

a. Predictors: (Constant), ADC, Total Net Community Benefits Expense, Net Income Profit
b. Predictors: (Constant), Average Executive Compensation

5
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Table 7
Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

T

Sig.

6.407

.000

Coefficients
B

Std. Error

(Constant)

396337.12

61859.52

ROA

-14976.47

5128.42

-.253

-2.920

.004

Net Income Profit

.001

.001

.273

2.800

.006

Net Community Benefit

.001

.001

.063

.760

.449

875.14

126.26

.565

6.931

.000

ADC

Beta

Applications to Professional Practice
The primary goal of this study was to close the gap in existing literature regarding
predictive executive compensation and the performance of the company as measured by
ROA, change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits expense while controlling
for ADC. The purpose of this study was to determine the predictive nature of executive
compensation on NPH performance. The findings of this study may be of significant
practical utility to professionals, academic researchers, and people seeking to understand
executive compensation of NPHs.
Academia may want to encompass and expand upon the contributions of this
study via further examination of possible correlating executive compensation and NPH
performance. The growing pools of NPH data, conjoined with various combinations may
influence nonprofit performance (Bai, 2012; Pinho, Rodrigues, & Dibb, 2014). The
results of this study offer a fresh perspective on NPH executive compensation and its
relationship with net community benefits expense.
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Moreover, the results of this study may be key elements NPH boards of directors
may use crafting executive compensation alignment strategies. NPH boards of directors
may use incentives to align executive decisions with company goals (Bosse & Phillips,
2014; Kistruck et al., 2013; Stanowski & Lynn, 2015). Though agency theory is
applicable when creating incentive packages (Song et al., 2015), there still exists the
possibility of executive motivation not aligning with NPH agenda (Galle & Walker,
2014).
Implications for Social Change
Maintaining IRS 501(c) (3) nonprofit status is imperative to NPH operations
(Bhargava, & Manoli, 2015; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015). The implications of
the study’s results could serve three potential purposes. The overall results indicated that
net community benefits expense was not a great predictor of executive compensation.
Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a negative relationship between net community
benefits expense and executive compensation. Thus, the opportunity exists for NPH
governance committees’ to investigate the negative relationship, while potentially
diverting additional funding to create more jobs in the communities in which they serve.
Furthermore, lawmakers may find the results useful as they construct legislation that may
increase NPH sustainability through various policies. Due to closures and mergers,
politicians may want to assign a percentage of net community benefits expense based on
NPH bed count, and ADC. Insurance companies may find the results useful for potential
lowering of premiums.
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Recommendations for Action
The existence of the agency problem greatly influences the need for executive
monitoring by the boards of directors (Dalton et al., 2007). The implications of results of
this study may serve three future purposes. For boards of directors, the overall results
indicated net community benefits relate to executive compensation. While the IRS
mandates net community benefits expense as a requirement to maintain 501(c) (3) status,
compensation package alignments may include maintaining such requirements. Thus,
retaining non-profit status enables the structure to remain as is without restructuring to
compete with for-profit entities. Secondly, NPH boards of directors may include various
metrics in executive salary packages such as ADC.
As a final point, academia, legislators, and scholar-practitioners may use the
results of this study to align governance policies in which community job creation occur.
Legislators may see a need to raise or lower the required community benefits expense
requirement. Scholar-practitioners may use the results of this study as a basis to explore
other areas of NPH expenditures and categories. I intend to publish the results of this
study in the ProQuest/UMI dissertation database, pursue academic journal publications,
and discuss results at academic conferences.
Recommendations for Further Research
In this study, I examined the relationship between executive compensation, ROA,
return on assets (profit), net community benefits expense, and ADC. Future researchers
may want to conduct a similar study examining multiple years focusing on those
hospitals with a minimum of 500 patient beds. Future researchers may also wish to

89
examine the numerous variable pools for relationships existing with the control variable
ADC, as there may be a relationship existing between change in net assets and ADC.
Additionally, scholars in the future may want examine the relationship between executive
compensation and negative ROA.
Reflections
My primary goal of this study was to understand executive compensation and its
relationship to NPH performance. I encountered numerous obstacles including the data
collection, analyzing, and interpretation of results. The NCCC, Guidestar, and CMS
websites were user-friendly but required the user to know their data needs. I spent
countless hours downloading the wrong data. However, once figuring out how CMS
catalogs their data, it became a much easier process. It was difficult to find the average
daily census for some of the hospitals, as maybe 20 of them did not post their total
inpatient days online. Although I reached out to many via phone calls and electronically,
very few responded within the timeframe needed for this study. I later discovered that
most annual reports include inpatient days for the reported period. The experience I
gained working with data will be valuable to me as I continue this research after
graduation.
Summary and Study Conclusions
The main purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate
executive compensation and its relationship to NPH performance. Explicitly, the first
goal was to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between executive
compensation, ROA, change in net assets (profit), and net community benefits expense
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while using ADC as a controlling variable. I examined the relationship using a linear
regression model and a sample of 117 NPHs.
The findings revealed that there is a statistically significant linear relationship
existing because all the p-values were less than that of the alpha of .05. As a result, I
rejected the null hypothesis H0, and failed to reject the alternative hypothesis H1. Thus, the
findings of a statistically significant relationship may indicate NPHs may be slowly
implementing net community benefits expense clauses into executive compensation
packages.
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